Essays on the labor force participation of older men by Goodstein, Ryan Michael
 ESSAYS ON THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF OLDER MEN 
 
 
 
 
Ryan Michael Goodstein 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the 
Department of Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapel Hill 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Approved By: 
 
 David Blau (Advisor) 
 
 Donna Gilleskie  
 
 David Guilkey 
 
 Tom Mroz  
 
 Helen Tauchen 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2008 
Ryan Michael Goodstein 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
iii 
ABSTRACT 
 
RYAN GOODSTEIN:  Essays on the Labor Force Participation of Older Men 
(Under the direction of David Blau) 
 
 
 This work is composed of two self-contained chapters that examine the Labor 
Force Participation (LFP) behavior of older men in the United States.  The first chapter 
analyzes the effect of wealth on LFP.  I use an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation 
approach that corrects for measurement error in wealth and unobservable taste variation 
across individuals.  Previous studies that do not control for these factors have found that 
wealth has very little effect on retirement.  My IV results reveal a larger wealth effect 
than in most previous studies; a $20k increase in wealth reduces the probability of LFP 
by about 1 percentage point.  The instruments are local housing price growth and 
unanticipated inheritances.  I cannot reject the hypothesis that the effects of housing and 
non-housing wealth on LFP are equal, although the power of my test is low.  Thus, my 
analysis suggests that older men are equally willing to “spend” an increase in housing and 
non-housing wealth on earlier retirement.   
 In the second chapter, my co-author (David Blau) and I examine trends in the 
Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) of older men.  After nearly a full century of 
decline, the LFPR of older men in the United States leveled off in the 1980s, and began 
to increase in the late 1990s.  We use a time series of cross sections from 1962 to 2005 to 
model the LFPR of men aged 55-69, with the aim of determining whether changes in the 
rules governing Social Security benefits can explain these trends.  Our results indicate 
iv 
that the decline in the LFPR from the 1960s through the 1980s cannot be explained by the 
increasing generosity of Social Security during this period.  The recent increase in the 
LFPR of older men can be explained by changes in the composition of the older male 
population away from high school dropouts and toward college attendees and graduates.  
Changes in Social Security may have contributed to the recent increase as well, but this 
result is sensitive to specification. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
THE EFFECT OF WEALTH ON THE LABOR FORCE  
PARTICIPATION OF OLDER MEN 
 
1.1  Introduction 
The U.S. population is aging rapidly as the baby boom generation reaches its 
elderly years.  This graying of the population will adversely affect the fiscal condition of 
Social Security and Medicare, as the number of workers paying into these programs will 
decrease relative to the number of beneficiaries.  Increasing labor supply at older ages is 
one way to improve the viability of these programs, so it is important to understand the 
key influences on the timing of retirement.   
Many studies have examined the impact of Social Security, private pensions, and 
employer provided retiree health insurance on retirement.  However, a number of these 
studies omit a potentially important factor – wealth – from their analyses of retirement 
behavior.  For example, the influential studies by Berkovec and Stern (1991), Rust and 
Phelan (1997), and Stock and Wise (1990) do not incorporate wealth in their structural 
models of retirement.1  Wealth at retirement age varies considerably, both across 
households and over time.  Median real wealth of households aged 55 to 64 increased by 
75% between 1989 and 2004 (Kennickell et al., 1997; Bucks et al., 2006).  Many older 
households saw their net worth rise and fall substantially as a result of the stock market 
                                                 
1 These studies justify the omission of wealth for at least two reasons: (1) data on net worth is either 
unavailable or measured with serious error, and (2) net worth of a typical household in their sample is 
small, particularly if housing wealth is ignored.  See Rust and Phelan (1997, p. 797) or Stock and Wise 
(1990, p. 1158) for a more complete discussion of why net worth is omitted from their models of retirement 
behavior. 
2 
boom and bust between 1995 and 2002; more recently the booming housing market has 
driven up net worth for many homeowners.2   Moreover, as employers continue to shift 
toward offering Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans in place of Defined Benefit 
(DB) pension plans, private pension benefits are increasingly received as a lump-sum 
rather than as a Social-Security-like lifetime annuity.3  As a result, older households will 
become increasingly reliant on their wealth to finance consumption in retirement.  The 
effect of wealth on labor supply at older ages is thus an interesting and important issue.  
It seems reasonable to suppose that leisure is a normal good, so an increase in 
wealth should increase demand for leisure.  One way to increase leisure is to retire 
earlier.  In practice, most studies have found that the wealth effect on retirement is very 
small and statistically insignificant (e.g. Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Blau, 1994; 
Samwick, 1998).  However, these estimates may be biased toward zero for two reasons.  
First, wealth is believed to be measured with considerable error in survey data (Juster et 
al., 1999).  Second, there is likely a positive cross-sectional correlation between wealth 
and age at retirement due to unobserved taste variation (Hurd and Reti, 2001).4  For 
example, an individual with relatively greater tastes for work or a higher degree of risk-
aversion may accumulate more wealth and retire later than his peers, imparting a spurious 
positive correlation between wealth and LFP that will tend to offset a “true” negative 
                                                 
2 Cheng and French (2000) estimate that unexpected gains in the stock market between 1995 and 1999 
increased national wealth in the U.S. by 17% (or $5.8 trillion).  I estimate that the housing price boom 
increased average wealth by 13% (or $28k) in 2004 among older men born between 1931 and 1941.  
3 A DB pension plan typically pays out an annuitized amount as a function of age and job tenure at the date 
of retirement and earnings in the years prior to retirement.  In a DC plan, pension wealth accumulates as a 
function of employer and employee contributions and the returns on those contributions.  Few individuals 
elect to convert their DC pension balances into an annuity when they retire (Johnson et al. 2004). 
4 Blau (1994) and Samwick (1998) use longitudinal data, so they exploit variation in wealth both across 
respondents and over time.  But changes in wealth over time are measured with even more error than the 
level of wealth (Juster et al., 1999), and there is likely persistence among respondents in the relative 
position in the wealth distribution, so most of the effective variation is cross-sectional.   
3 
effect.   
In this paper I use an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation approach to estimate 
the effect of wealth on retirement.  I rely on two sources of variation to identify the 
wealth effect.  The first is geographic variation in the rate of housing price changes.  This 
variation has been particularly sharp over the past decade, as prices have boomed in some 
markets while remaining flat in others.5  Further, this variation is likely to be strongly 
associated with variation in household wealth.  Over 80% of households with a head aged 
65 and older own a home, and residential real estate represents the single largest asset 
class held by this group (Agpar and Di, 2005).  I control for local economic conditions in 
the analysis; thus the remaining variation in the growth of local housing prices can be 
attributed mainly to location-specific demographic and geographic factors (e.g., 
population growth on a fixed supply of land), which I assume is exogenous with respect 
to the retirement decision.     
The second source of identifying variation is unanticipated inheritances.  
Receiving an inheritance is common in the age range of retirement:  one in five 
households with a member aged 51 to 61 in 1992 received an inheritance between 1994 
and 2002, with a median value of $30,000 (Brown et al., 2006).  I use self-reported 
inheritance expectations to control for variation in anticipated inheritances.  An 
inheritance that was anticipated by the recipient is unlikely to provide an exogenous 
source of variation in wealth, because retirement decisions may be affected prior to 
receiving the inheritance.  I assume that the remaining variation in inheritance after 
controlling for expectations is unanticipated and therefore an exogenous shock to wealth.   
                                                 
5 The real growth rate of housing prices ranges from less than 20% (e.g. Dallas, TX; Pittsburgh, PA) to 
nearly 100% (e.g. Boston, MA; San Diego, CA) over the period 1994 to 2004 (source: author’s calculations 
based on House Price Index data published by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight). 
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This study provides two main contributions to the economic literature on 
retirement.  First, this is the first analysis to use an IV approach to estimate the effect of 
wealth on retirement.  The IV approach corrects for both measurement error and 
endogeneity of wealth.  Second, I examine whether the effect of housing wealth on 
retirement is different than the effect of non-housing wealth.  There is some debate 
among economists about the willingness of the elderly to use housing wealth to finance 
consumption in retirement (Scholz et al., 2006).6  Evidence from Venti and Wise (2004) 
suggests that most elderly households do not spend down housing wealth in retirement.  
If older men are also unwilling to consume housing wealth in the form of leisure, the 
effect of housing wealth on retirement should be smaller than the effect of non-housing 
wealth.   
I estimate the model using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) on men born between 1931 and 1941, observed over the years 1996 to 2004.  My 
results indicate that an increase in wealth leads to earlier withdrawal from the labor force, 
consistent with the assumption that leisure is a normal good.  The IV estimate is that a 
$20k increase in wealth, which would increase the wealth of a household at the median 
level of wealth by 19%, reduces the probability of participating in the labor force by 
about 1 percentage point.  The OLS estimate of the wealth effect is smaller in absolute 
value, consistent with expectations based on the measurement error and unobserved 
heterogeneity arguments discussed above.  These findings are robust to alternative 
definitions of retirement and to a variety of specification checks.   
                                                 
6 This question has implications for a related and controversial issue:  are people saving enough for 
retirement?  The adequacy of saving for retirement depends crucially on whether one believes that housing 
wealth qualifies as “retirement savings”.  Venti and Wise (2004) conclude that home equity should not be 
counted on to finance non-housing consumption in retirement, while Engen et al. (2000) argue that at least 
a substantial portion of home equity should be considered retirement savings.   
5 
I use my estimates to simulate the impact of the extraordinary gains in housing 
prices since 1995 on the LFP rate of older men.  Results from a counterfactual simulation 
in which the housing price appreciation rate remained at its pre-1995 level imply that the 
LFP rate of men born between 1931 and 1941 in the US would have been 1.3 percentage 
points higher in 2004 had housing prices appreciated at the normal rate.   
The second main finding is that the null hypothesis that housing and non-housing 
wealth have the same effect on LFP cannot be rejected.  This result is consistent with the 
view of Engen et al. (2000), who argue that a substantial portion of home equity should 
be considered available to finance consumption in retirement. However, the IV estimates 
of separate housing and non-housing wealth effects are not very precise, so the evidence 
on this point is somewhat weak. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:  Section 1.2 reviews the 
existing relevant literature, Section 1.3 describes the data, Section 1.4 introduces the 
empirical specification used in the analysis, Section 1.5 discusses the results, and Section 
1.6 concludes.   
 
1.2  Background 
As noted above, studies that treat household wealth as exogenous find that net 
worth has little effect on retirement.  These papers typically do not focus on producing an 
unbiased estimate of the wealth effect; rather they simply include a control for wealth 
when estimating a model of retirement.  For example, Blau (1994) studies quarterly 
transition rates in and out of full-time and part-time work among older men in the 
Retirement History Survey.  His estimates imply that an increase in wealth from $0 to 
6 
$100,000 would reduce the transition rate from full-time work to out of the labor force by 
9% among older men, a counterintuitive result.  Samwick (1998) examines the effect of 
pensions and social security incentives on the timing of retirement among older men and 
women in the Surveys of Consumer Finance.  His results imply that financial (i.e., non-
housing) wealth has essentially zero effect on entry into retirement, while an increase in 
housing wealth is associated with a lower rate of entry into retirement. 
Recognizing that wealth is likely to be endogenous with respect to retirement, 
recent studies have examined the effect of exogenous shocks to wealth on the timing of 
retirement.  Imbens et al. (2001) examine the effect of lottery winnings on labor earnings 
among a sample of lottery players.  They report that earnings of men ages 55 to 65 
decline by 16 cents for every dollar increase in the annual payout from winning a lottery.  
This implies that a $20k increase in wealth would reduce the probability of LFP by 
roughly 1.5 percentage points.7   
Other papers have examined the effect of the 1995 – 2002 stock market boom and 
bust on retirement behavior.  Results from these studies are mixed.  Hurd and Reti (2001) 
find that wealth has little impact on subjective probabilities of working past age 62 
among men in the HRS.  Coile and Levine (2006) find no evidence that changes in the 
stock market drove aggregate trends in labor supply among men and women between 
1995 and 2002.  However, Coronado and Perozek (2003) find that, conditional on 
retirement expectations formed prior to the stock market boom, a $100k increase in 
wealth leads to a 1 month earlier retirement among stock holders.  The authors note that 
                                                 
7 Lottery winnings are paid out over a 20 year period for their sample.  The 20 year annuitized value of a 
$20k increase in wealth is approximately $1.5k annually.  Under the assumption that mean annual earnings 
of men ages 55 to 65 are equal to the sample mean of $16.1k, and that a man can choose whether or not to 
work but cannot adjust his hours of work, the implied LFP response from a $20k increase in wealth is equal 
to (.16)*($1.5k)/($16.1k) = 1.5 percentage points.   
7 
including ex-ante retirement expectations in their specification controls for individual 
heterogeneity that might influence both wealth and the retirement decision.  Cheng and 
French (2000) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) both estimate dynamic structural 
models of retirement.  Their simulation results indicate that wealth has an important 
effect on retirement.   Both studies find that stock market gains between 1995 and 1999 
may have reduced LFP rates as much as 3.3 percentage points among older men.    
My analysis builds on the work of two recent papers within this strand of the 
literature.  Farnham and Sevak (2006) were the first to examine whether changes in 
housing prices have an effect on retirement behavior.  The authors estimate a reduced 
form model of retirement in which the growth rate of local area housing prices is the key 
explanatory variable.  Their results indicate that a nominal 10% increase in the local price 
of housing since 1992 is associated with a 6% increase in the annual rate of transition into 
self-assessed retirement over the period 1992 to 2002.  The second paper, by Brown et al. 
(2006), was the first to examine the effect of receiving an inheritance on retirement.8  The 
authors specify a model in which the incidence of retiring earlier than expected (based on 
self-assessed retirement status) is regressed on anticipated and unanticipated inheritances.  
They find that an anticipated inheritance of $100k leads to a 10% increase in the 
probability of retiring earlier than expected among HRS respondents over the period 1994 
to 2002, and the effect for an unanticipated inheritance is over twice as large. 
In summary, studies that rely on cross-sectional variation in wealth are likely to 
yield estimates of the wealth effect that are biased toward zero.  There are few studies 
                                                 
8 Two earlier papers examine the effect of inheritances on labor supply, although each focuses on the non-
elderly population in the U.S.  Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) find that among households ages 20 to 58, 
inheritance recipients are substantially more likely to exit the labor force than non-recipients.  Joulfaian and 
Wilhelm (1994) also find that inheritances lead to reductions in labor supply, although the effects are 
smaller and somewhat sensitive to specification. 
8 
that use plausibly exogenous variation in wealth to estimate the wealth effect on labor 
supply at older ages, and those that do rely on variation in lottery winnings and stock 
market returns that may not be relevant for most households.  Farnham and Sevak (2006) 
and Brown et al. (2006) investigate the effect of local area housing prices and 
unanticipated inheritances on the timing of retirement, but do not directly estimate the 
effect of wealth on labor supply at older ages.  This paper is the first to use an IV 
approach to estimate the effect of wealth on retirement.  I use local area housing prices 
and unanticipated inheritances to identify the wealth effect.9  If these instruments affect 
the retirement decision only through their impact on wealth, this estimation approach 
yields a consistent estimate of the wealth effect.    
 
1.3  Data  
The analysis in this paper is based primarily on data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS).  These data contain an abundance of information on 
demographic characteristics, health, labor supply, income, and wealth for a sample of 
individuals in the United States born between 1931 and 1941 and their spouses.  
Respondents have been interviewed biannually since 1992, and data through 2004 are 
currently available to the public.  An innovative feature of the HRS is that survey 
respondents are asked a number of questions on their expectations of future events, 
including future inheritances.  Data on expected inheritances are available in years 1994 
and later.  As the empirical specification in this paper (described in detail in the next 
section) models retirement in part as a function of inheritance expectations from the 
                                                 
9 Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also used inheritances and regional house price variation as instruments for 
wealth in a model of entry into business ownership.   
9 
previous wave, the analysis is based on HRS data from years 1996 – 2004 (and lagged 
values of inheritance expectations from years 1994 – 2002).   
In addition to HRS data, I use the House Price Index (HPI) published by the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight to measure local housing price changes.  
Local areas are defined by Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSA) determined by the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget.  Restricted-access geographic identifiers are used to 
match local area HPI data to each respondent record in the HRS.10  The HPI measures the 
growth of single family house prices based on repeated mortgage transactions for 
individual homes.11  The HPI is published quarterly; I annualize the data by averaging the 
quarterly values for each year.  I also adjust the HPI for inflation using the national 
Consumer Price Index series less shelter for all urban consumers.  Failure to adjust for 
inflation would result in overstated rates of housing price growth relative to the real value 
of money.   For each year and CBSA, I compute the percent change in the HPI over the 
previous 10 years, and use this measure as an instrument for wealth in the analysis.  The 
choice of a 10-year window is arbitrary, but this is the longest window over which 
changes in HPI can be computed for most CBSAs in the sample.12  Housing price 
appreciation over the long run is likely to be a more powerful predictor of wealth than 
short run (year-to-year) changes since household mobility at older ages is low.  As of 
1995, 76% of homeowners aged 65 or older resided in their present homes for 10 years or 
                                                 
10 Restricted-access HRS geographic data includes the FIPS state and county code, which can be matched 
to HPI data published at the CBSA level.  CBSA definitions replaced the old Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) definitions effective in June 2003.   
11 The OFHEO uses repeated observations of housing values on single family residential properties on 
which at least two mortgages were originated and subsequently purchased by either Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac since January 1975.  The use of repeat transactions on the same physical property helps to control for 
differences in the quality of of the houses within a geographic area over time.  See Calhoun (1996) for 
more details.   
12 HPI data are not available for years prior to the mid 1980s for many CBSAs.   
10 
more (Citro, 1998).   
The analysis is limited to the retirement behavior of men because many women in 
this cohort were not career participants in the labor force.  Those who are self-employed 
in any survey are omitted from the sample; self-employed men may be quite different 
than employees in their tastes for work and in the retirement incentives they face.  There 
are 2,932 men in the HRS born between 1931 and 1941 who were not self-employed, 
resulting in 12,728 person-year observations for years 1996 through 2004.  I dropped 
11% of these observations due to incomplete or missing data.13  Of the remaining 11,296 
observations, 29% reside in locations for which there are no HPI data.  These records are 
also dropped.  Although these drops are non-random, the estimates presented in this 
paper are not sensitive to including the omitted observations.14  The final analysis sample 
includes 8,021 person-year records.   
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.1.  In this study, I focus on LFP at 
the survey date as the main outcome of interest.  This is an objective measure of 
retirement that is widely used in the literature.  I also examine whether the findings are 
robust to use of alternative measures of retirement:  full-time work and self-assessed 
retirement status.15  Personal characteristics of each respondent included in the analysis 
                                                 
13 Observations with missing or incomplete housing and stock market wealth data comprise the great 
majority of these drops (1,421 observations); only observations where an exact amount is reported or the 
series of bracketed questions used to determine the amount of housing or stock market wealth is completed 
are kept.  An additional three observations are deemed outliers and are dropped (two with total wealth in 
excess of 10 million; one with non-housing wealth over 7.5 million).  Three additional records are dropped 
due to missing health status and five are dropped due to a missing local unemployment rate. 
14 Based on estimates from a linear probability model, the likelihood of being dropped from the sample due 
to missing data on wealth does not appear to vary by education or age.  Black men and married men are 
slightly more likely to have missing wealth values, while men in bad health are slightly less likely to have 
missing wealth.  Respondents for whom no HPI data are available typically reside in rural areas.  These 
respondents are more likely to be white (non-black and non-Hispanic) and have less education.     
15 I define full-time work as 35 hours or more per week and 36 weeks or more per year.  If the man reports 
that he is either fully or partially retired, I define his retirement status as “retired”.  Otherwise he is “not 
retired”. 
11 
are age and indicators for educational attainment (no high school degree; high school 
degree; some college; college degree), ethnicity (Hispanic; non-Hispanic), race (black; 
non-black), marital status (married; non-married), and bad health (equal to 1 if self 
assessed health status is fair or poor, 0 otherwise).  
I control for local economic conditions because they may influence both 
employment opportunities for older men and housing prices.  I include the unemployment 
rate, per capita personal income, and the share of workers in the area employed in jobs 
that require manual labor.  The latter measure reflects the likelihood that alternative jobs 
are available if an older man becomes unable to do physically demanding work.16   
Table 1.1 also summarizes variables that are used to control for inheritance 
expectations.  In each wave of the HRS in years 1994 and later, respondents are asked a 
series of questions on their inheritance expectations.  I use lagged values of inheritance 
expectations to ensure that the expectations were formed prior to receiving any 
inheritances since the past survey.  The inheritance expectation questions are not 
answered in 15% of the responses; in these cases a missing value indicator is set to 1 and 
all other inheritance expectation measures are set to 0.  Respondents are first asked to rate 
their chances (from 0 to 10) of receiving an inheritance within the next 10 years.  I 
convert these to a probability measure on the unit interval; 29% of respondents report a 
positive probability of receiving an inheritance, and the mean expected probability of 
receiving an inheritance is 16%.  Respondents who report a positive probability are asked 
                                                 
16 Local area unemployment rates are published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Local per capita income 
data are published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The share of workers employed in manual labor 
jobs is computed from Current Population Survey data based on occupation codes.  Only men between the 
ages of 35 to 55 are included in the computation to reduce self-selection bias due to withdrawal from the 
labor force.   In cases where I observe 25 or less records in a CBSA I use state-level data to compute the 
share of manual laborers.   
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how large the inheritance is expected to be; this value is the variable Expected 
Inheritance Amount.17  If the respondent expects an inheritance but does not report an 
expected amount then Expected Inheritance Amount is set to 0 and a missing value 
indicator is set to 1.  Conditional on expecting an inheritance, the average Expected 
Inheritance Amount was $68,300.  
Information about the respondent’s parents is also useful for predicting his 
inheritances.  An indicator equal to 1 if the mother did not complete high school (and 0 
otherwise) and a count of living parents (0, 1, or 2) as of the previous wave are included 
in the analysis.  If the respondent was married in the previous wave then these variables 
are also included for the spouse’s parents; otherwise these variables are set to zero.   
Table 1.2 summarizes the distribution of wealth.  Total Wealth is defined as the 
sum of Housing and Non-Housing Wealth.  Non-Housing wealth consists of stock market 
wealth, vehicles, private businesses, IRA and Keough accounts, checking and savings 
accounts, CDs, government bonds and T-bills, bonds and bond funds, other real estate, 
and “other”, minus non-housing debt.  The mean value of Total Wealth (in 1992 dollars) 
is $210k, while the median value is $108k.  The distribution of wealth is heavily skewed 
to the right.  This is primarily due to the distribution of non-housing wealth; the mean 
value is $134k while the median is just $36k.  Housing wealth is not as concentrated as 
non-housing wealth; the difference between the mean ($76k) and the median ($58k) is 
much smaller.   
Table 1.2 also summarizes the distributions of the variables used as instruments 
for wealth.  The mean 10-year growth rate of the real housing price over the entire 
                                                 
17 If the respondent does not report an exact expected inheritance amount then the value is assigned based 
on his answers to the series of bracketed responses.  In this case I set the expected inheritance amount equal 
to the midpoint of the bracket. 
13 
sample is 15%.  Appreciation rates vary substantially across local areas and over time; 
the 10-year growth rate is -13% at the 10th percentile and 51% at the 90th percentile.  
3.5% of respondents received an inheritance within the past 2 years (i.e. since the 
previous survey); conditional on receiving an inheritance, the median value is $30k and 
the mean is $82k.  15% of respondents received at least one inheritance since 1994, with 
a median cumulative value of $27k.   
Figure 1.1 presents the labor force participation rate by age for the sample.  Most 
of the “action” in retirement behavior encompasses the ages included in this survey.  The 
LFP rate drops from nearly 90% at age 55 to 20% at ages 70 and over.  Labor supply 
seems to drop most sharply at ages 61 through 65; these are the ages at which most men 
decide to retire.   The sharp decline from age 54 to age 55 is unexpected; this may be due 
to a small sample size of men at age 54.  Age patterns of the alternative retirement 
outcomes (Full-time work and self-assessed retirement) are quite similar.   
 
1.4  Empirical Model and Identification of the Wealth Effect 
The conceptual framework for this analysis is a standard life cycle model.18  In 
each period a man chooses consumption of goods and leisure to maximize the expected 
present discounted value of utility over his remaining lifetime.  These choices are 
restricted by an intertemporal budget constraint:  consumption of goods in the current 
period reduces savings that can be used to finance consumption in future periods, while 
consumption of leisure reduces earnings that can be used to finance consumption in the 
current and future periods.  Utility is derived from consumption of goods and leisure, and 
preferences may depend on individual characteristics including age, health, education, 
                                                 
18 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a discussion of the life cycle model.   
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and marital status.  
The labor force participation choice in period t is made by comparing V1(St) and 
V0(St), where V1(St) and V0(St) are the value functions associated with participation and 
non-participation, respectively, conditional on the optimal level of consumption in each 
case and the optimal level of hours of work in the case of participation.  St is the vector of 
state variables that characterizes the man’s situation in period t.  St includes wealth, the 
wage offer, retirement income in the event of non-participation in the labor force (e.g. 
Social Security and pension benefits), and personal characteristics (e.g. age, health, 
marital status).  The man will choose to participate in the labor force if V1(St) is greater 
than V0(St). 
1.4.1  Empirical Model 
The empirical model used in this paper can be interpreted as a linear 
approximation to the LFP decision rule.  In this specification, man i’s participation choice 
in period t is:  
ititititititit ZYXtaWP εβββββββ +++++++= −16543210  
where  
Pit  is 1 if the man chooses to participate in the labor force in period t, and 0 
otherwise 
Wit  is net worth 
ait   is a vector of age fixed effects  
t     is a vector of year fixed effects 
Xit  is a vector of personal characteristics  
  (education, race, ethnicity, marital status, and health status) 
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Yit   is a vector of variables that characterize economic conditions in man i's local 
area in period t  
Zit-1 is a vector of variables that characterizes expectations as of t-1 of receiving an 
inheritance between period t-1 and t  
itiit νµε += , where iµ  is an individual specific time invariant error and itν  is an iid 
error 
 
 The man’s preferences for retirement are a function of his age (ait) and other 
personal characteristics in Xit.  The retirement decision may also depend in part on 
economic conditions in a given year.  The vector of year fixed effects t  controls for 
cyclical variation in national economic conditions, and Yit controls for variation in local 
labor market conditions over time.  Lagged inheritance expectations (Zit-1) are included in 
the specification to control for variation across individuals in their subjective probability 
distribution of receiving an inheritance.  
The model is specified as a linear function in order to facilitate the use of 
Instrumental Variables estimation.19  Standard errors are clustered by individual in order 
to allow for arbitrary forms of correlation in the disturbance iµ  across periods for a given 
individual.   
I estimate two versions of the empirical model that differ by the specification of 
wealth.  In the first specification housing and non-housing wealth are aggregated into a 
single measure of total net worth (Wit); this is consistent with a standard life cycle model 
in which there is no distinction among different types of assets.  However, as noted 
                                                 
19 Probit and IV Probit estimates yield marginal effects that are very similar to those produced by the linear 
model. 
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earlier there is evidence that older households are less likely to spend down housing 
wealth than other forms of wealth.  This may be because housing is a non-liquid asset, 
and the financial and emotional costs of converting housing wealth to a liquid asset may 
be substantial.20  Factoring in the costs of liquidating housing wealth, $1 of housing 
wealth may be worth less than $1 of non-housing wealth to an older man.  If this is the 
case, the housing wealth effect should be smaller than the non-housing wealth effect on 
LFP.  To examine this possibility I estimate a second empirical specification in which 
housing wealth and non-housing wealth enter separately, relaxing the restriction that their 
effects are equal.  In this case, 1β consists of two parameters:  
H
1β  (the effect of housing 
wealth on retirement) and N1β (the effect of non-housing wealth on retirement). 
A limitation of this analysis is that wages and retirement income are omitted from 
the specification.  A standard economic model implies that a man should consider these 
variables when making his LFP decision.  However, wages are observed only for men 
who choose to work and retirement income is observed only for older men who no longer 
work.  Because the omitted variables are correlated with a man’s age, personal 
characteristics, and local economic conditions, including these variables in the analysis 
partially controls for the effect of wage rate and retirement income.  However, the 
unobserved determinants of wages and retirement income will be in the disturbance of 
the LFP equation.  Thus, the parameter 1β  must be interpreted as the effect of wealth on 
                                                 
20 Housing wealth can be converted to a liquid asset by selling the home and moving to a new residence or 
by borrowing against the home.  Venti and Wise (2004) find that it is uncommon for a homeowner to 
consume housing wealth by selling his home and moving to a new residence, likely due to financial and 
emotional transactions costs of doing so.  It is more common for older households to access their housing 
wealth by borrowing against the home.  Nearly 60 percent of men in the HRS sample hold some form of 
debt against their home, and between 15 and 20 percent carry a balance on a home equity line of credit 
(Source: author’s calculations from HRS data).  Borrowing against the home via a reverse mortgage is not 
common, possibly due to high transactions costs of doing so (Caplin, 2000).   
17 
retirement not holding the wage rate and retirement income constant.  This approach is 
consistent with other papers in the literature.21  Because wealth is positively correlated 
with wages and with retirement income, the wealth effect holding these variables 
constant may be larger or smaller than the wealth effect parameter I estimate.  As the 
wage rate increases a man is more likely to work (because the opportunity cost of not 
working is higher); as retirement income increases a man is less likely to work.  In 
practice, the impact of omitting wages and retirement income from the specification may 
be small.22  
1.4.2  Identification of the Wealth Effect  
OLS estimates of the empirical model are unbiased if the error term itε  is 
orthogonal to the explanatory variables.  However, as noted earlier wealth is likely to be 
positively correlated with itε  due to measurement error and unobservable heterogeneity 
across individuals.  Thus the OLS estimate of 1β  may be biased toward zero.  In this 
paper I use an IV estimation approach in which wealth is instrumented with (1) the 10-
year growth rate in the local housing market, and (2) unanticipated inheritances.  I 
estimate the IV model using Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). 
The IV estimation approach identifies the effect of an increase in wealth on LFP 
among people impacted by changes in HPI (e.g. homeowners) and by inheritances.  If 
                                                 
21 For example, Imbens et al. (2001) do not control for wages or retirement income in their study of the 
effect of lottery winnings on labor earnings.  Coronado and Perozek (2003) do not control for wages or 
retirement income in their study of stock market wealth effects on the timing of retirement.  Lehnert (2004) 
and Morris (2006) control for permanent income but not wages or retirement income in their studies of 
housing wealth effects on consumption of goods and services.   
22 Blau (1994) finds that the effect of the wage rate on labor force exits is small and not significantly 
different from zero when individual characteristics are controlled for in the specification, while Samwick 
(1998) finds that the effect of wages is sensitive to specification.  Using data from the HRS, my estimates 
of the wealth effect change very little when the man’s last reported wage and variables that characterize 
retirement income (DB and DC pension indicators, an indicator for employer provided retiree health 
insurance) are added to the specification. 
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homeowners and inheritance recipients differ from their counterparts in some unobserved 
way, this Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) may not be equal to the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) of wealth on LFP for the population.23  For example, if a smaller 
proportion of homeowners and inheritance recipients are on the margin of exiting the 
labor force (perhaps because they have stronger tastes for work), then the LATE will be 
smaller in magnitude than the ATE.    
The key assumption of the IV approach is that the instruments are correlated with 
wealth, but do not affect the retirement decision through any other channel.  Variation in 
housing price growth rates across localities is likely to be a valid instrument for wealth if 
growth in housing prices is due mainly to location-specific demographic and geographic 
factors, i.e. population growth on a fixed supply of land.  However, if growth of local 
area housing prices is driven by unobserved economic factors, then the identification 
assumption may be violated.  For example, strong economic growth in an area may put 
upward pressure on both housing prices and wages.  I control for local area economic 
conditions in the empirical analysis with Yit, which includes CBSA-year specific 
measures of the local unemployment rate, per-capita income, and percentage of the local 
labor force that works in manual labor.24  To the extent that Yit  does not fully control for 
the man’s wage rate, HPI will be positively correlated with the error term in the LFP 
                                                 
23 The notion of LATE was introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994).      
24 I explored alternative specifications that included additional measures of CBSA-level economic activity, 
including educational distribution and state level GDP, and 10-year growth rates of each.  The additional 
measures added little information, likely because measures of economic activity are highly collinear.  I also 
estimated a model that included CBSA fixed effects.  The inclusion of CBSA fixed effects is attractive 
because they control for long run differences in the level of economic activity across CBSAs.  However, 
the inclusion of CBSA dummies absorbs variation across CBSAs in the average rate of 10-year housing 
price growth.  Thus, only time series variation around the trend in housing price growth within each CBSA 
is left to identify the wealth effect.  In practice, this variation is insufficient to identify the wealth effect.  
When CBSA fixed effects are added to the specification, 2SLS estimates of the wealth effect where wealth 
is instrumented with HPI become quite small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.     
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equation and the use of HPI as an instrument is suspect.   
To check the validity of local housing price growth as an instrument for wealth, I 
estimate reduced form models to examine the correlation between HPI, wealth, and LFP 
separately by home ownership status.  HPI and wealth should be positively correlated 
among homeowners and not positively correlated among non-homeowners, because non-
homeowners do not receive the direct financial windfall that homeowners do when 
housing prices increase.  The estimates presented in Table 1.3 are consistent with this 
hypothesis.  Each entry in the table is the coefficient on HPI from a separate wealth 
regression.  The estimate in row 1, column 1 indicates that a 0.1 increase in HPI (i.e. a 
10% increase in the 10-year growth rate of local housing prices) is associated with an 
increase in total wealth of $12,780 among homeowners.  In contrast, HPI has little effect 
on the wealth of non-homeowners.  A 0.1 increase in HPI implies a $2,310 decrease in 
net worth among non-homeowners, and this estimate is not significantly different from 
zero.25   
Given that the HPI is uncorrelated with the wealth of non-homeowners, if the HPI 
is correlated with the LFP choice of non-homeowners then it is likely that unobserved 
factors correlated with HPI impact the retirement decision directly and the use of HPI as 
an instrument is suspect.  The results in the 2nd column of Table 1.3 show that this is not 
the case.  An increase in HPI has essentially zero effect on LFP among non-homeowners.  
Therefore the HPI does not appear to be correlated with omitted factors that affect the 
LFP choice among non-homeowners.  As long as there are no omitted factors that impact 
homeowners differently than non-homeowners, this result suggests that HPI is a valid 
instrument.   
                                                 
25 All significance tests discussed in the text are at the 5% level.   
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The second instrument for wealth in this analysis is inheritances.  Anticipated 
inheritances are not a valid source of identification because labor supply choices could be 
affected prior to receiving an anticipated inheritance, and past labor supply choices likely 
affect the current labor supply decision through a channel other than wealth.  Conversely, 
an unanticipated inheritance is a plausibly exogenous shock to wealth.  I control for 
subjective inheritance expectations and parent’s characteristics that may be correlated 
with inheritances in the empirical specification.26  By controlling for observed variables 
that help predict inheritances, using inheritances as an identifying instrument is 
equivalent to using only the part of the inheritance that is uncorrelated with the 
predictors.  This remaining variation in inheritances is assumed to be unanticipated and 
therefore uncorrelated with the error term.  
 I use two alternative measures of inheritances in this study:  (1) recent 
inheritances (the sum of inheritances received since the last survey wave) and (2) 
cumulative inheritances (the sum of inheritances received since 1994).  Cumulative 
inheritances are a potentially stronger instrument for wealth than recent inheritances, as 
inheritances received prior to the last survey are likely to be positively correlated with 
wealth in the current period.  However, use of cumulative inheritances as an instrument is 
somewhat tenuous, as even a wholly unanticipated inheritance received in the past may 
have affected past labor supply decisions.  Due to this tradeoff, I present TSLS estimates 
                                                 
26 Brown et al. (2006) present descriptive analysis which indicates that the subjective inheritance 
expectations help predict inheritance receipt; both the incidence of receiving an inheritance and the size of 
the inheritance rises with the expected probability of receipt. I estimated a reduced form model in which 
inheritance receipts received in the last 2 years are regressed on subjective inheritance expectations data as 
well as parent’s (and spouse’s parent’s if applicable) characteristics that may affect inheritance 
expectations.  The model also includes age and year dummies, personal characteristics, and local area 
economic conditions.  The R-squared is .08, and nearly all of the explanatory power can be attributed to the 
man’s subjective inheritance expectations and the characteristics of his (and his spouse’s) parents.  The R-
squared from a model that omits these variables is less than .01.   
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of the wealth effect for each alternative inheritance measure. 
Table 1.4 presents selected results from the first stage of the TSLS estimation 
procedure.  Each column reports coefficient estimates from separate regressions that vary 
by the identifying instruments for wealth.  In column 1, the identifying instrument is the 
HPI.  The F statistic on a test of the null hypothesis that the HPI can be omitted from the 
first stage equation is 13.36, which is above the “rule of thumb” minimum value of 10 for 
a sufficiently powerful instrument (Staiger and Stock, 1997).  In column 2 the identifying 
instrument is recent inheritances.  The coefficient estimate is not significantly different 
from zero and the F test statistic of 3.50 implies that recent inheritances are a weak 
instrument for total wealth.  As expected, cumulative inheritances are a much stronger 
instrument for wealth in the first stage, as evidenced by the F statistic of 10.32 in column 
3.  Wealth is instrumented with HPI and recent inheritances in column 4, and HPI and 
cumulative inheritances in column 5.  In both cases the F statistic suggests that these 
variables are sufficiently powerful instruments for wealth.   
 
1.5  Results 
1.5.1  Estimates  
I first estimate the empirical model using a measure of total net worth as the key 
explanatory variable.  I estimate the model under four alternative assumptions about 
identification:  (1) Wealth is exogenous; (2) Wealth is endogenous and the 10-year 
growth rate in local housing prices is a valid identifying instrument; (3) Wealth is 
endogenous and unanticipated inheritances is a valid identifying instrument; and (4) 
Wealth is endogenous and both instruments are valid.   
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Estimates of the wealth effect on LFP under each identifying assumption are 
presented in Table 1.5.  In panel (a) the instruments for wealth are HPI and inheritances 
received in the past two years.  The OLS estimate of the wealth effect on LFP is negative, 
small, and precisely estimated.  An increase in total wealth of $100k, which would nearly 
double the assets held by a man at the median level of total wealth, decreases the 
probability of participating in the labor force by 1.5 percentage points.  The TSLS 
coefficient estimates of the wealth effect on LFP are two to four times as large in absolute 
value as the OLS estimate.  However, the magnitude of the wealth effect on LFP implied 
by the TSLS estimates is somewhat sensitive to the identification assumption.  In 
particular, the estimate in specification 2 is nearly twice as large as the estimate in 
specification 3, and neither is significantly different from zero.   
In panel (b) the instruments for wealth are HPI and cumulative inheritances 
received since 1994.  The p-value of 0.758 from a Sargen-Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions indicates that these are valid instruments for wealth.  The joint null hypothesis 
of this test is that the identifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and 
correctly excluded from the LFP equation.  Using these instruments, the TSLS point 
estimates of the wealth effect are similar across each alternative identification 
assumption.  The estimates of the wealth effect range from  -0.044 to -0.056, and the 
estimates are significantly different from zero in two of the three cases.  The most 
precisely estimated TSLS coefficient on wealth (from column 4) indicates that a $100k 
increase in wealth reduces LFP by 4.5 percentage points.  The difference between this 
TSLS point estimate and the OLS point estimate is 0.0301, and this difference is 
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significantly different from zero.27  This indicates that the OLS estimate is biased toward 
zero, likely due to endogeneity of wealth and measurement error in wealth as noted 
earlier. 
Table 1.6 presents estimates of the specification in which the effects of housing 
wealth and non-housing wealth on LFP are allowed to differ.  I find no evidence that the 
housing wealth effect is smaller than the non-housing wealth effect.  Under the 
assumption that wealth is exogenous, OLS estimates imply that the housing wealth effect 
is larger than the non-housing wealth effect by a factor of three.  The coefficient 
estimates are each significantly different from zero, and the difference between the 
estimated wealth effects is significantly different from zero at the 5% level (p-value = 
0.0449).  In the TSLS estimation approach, housing and non-housing wealth are 
instrumented with HPI and the cumulative value of inheritances received since 1994.  
The TSLS point estimates again suggest that the effect of housing wealth on retirement is 
larger than the effect of non-housing wealth.  This is a surprising result.  It is not obvious 
why the LFP decision might be more sensitive to housing wealth than other forms of 
wealth, particularly given the relative illiquidity of housing wealth as noted earlier.28  
However, the precision of the TSLS estimates is poor – neither estimate is significantly 
different from zero.  In every case I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the wealth 
effects are equal.  This implies that the hypothesis that all forms of wealth have the same 
effect on retirement is not rejected.  Thus in the remainder of this paper I focus on results 
                                                 
27 The standard error on the difference between coefficient estimates is computed using bootstrapping with 
1000 replications.    
28 Others have found that housing wealth effects may be larger than non-housing wealth effects on 
consumption of goods and services.  Bostic et al. (2005), Morris (2006), and Carrol et al. (2006) each find 
that the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from housing wealth is larger than the MPC from non-
housing wealth.  Juster et al. (2005) reach the opposite conclusion.  Bostic et al. (2005, p.18) speculate that 
housing wealth effects may be larger in some cases if consumers regard changes in house values as more 
permanent than changes in other financial wealth.   
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from the model in which the key explanatory variable is total wealth.  
The full set of OLS coefficient estimates is presented in Appendix Table A.1.   
The estimates on personal characteristics, local area economic conditions, and inheritance 
expectations are generally of the expected sign, so I discuss them only briefly here. Age 
and health effects are large and significantly different from zero; the probability of 
participating is substantially lower at older ages and for those in bad health.  
Characteristics that are typical of low-wage earners (e.g. lower educational attainment, 
not married, black) are associated with lower LFP.29  The estimated effects of local 
economic conditions are intuitive – the probability of participating in the labor force is 
decreasing in the unemployment rate and the share of blue-collar jobs, and increasing in 
per-capita personal income.  An increase in the expected probability of receiving an 
inheritance is associated with a lower probability of participating, although the estimate is 
not significantly different from zero.   
1.5.2  Discussion 
Overall, my estimates suggest that wealth has a modest effect on LFP rates of 
older men.  A $20k increase in wealth, which amounts to a 19% change in wealth for a 
man at the median level of wealth, reduces the probability of LFP by about 1 percentage 
point.  This estimate is larger in magnitude than those from previous studies (e.g. 
Diamond and Hausman, 1984; Blau, 1994; Samwick, 1998) in which wealth is assumed 
to be exogenous.  My estimate is somewhat smaller than the wealth effect implied by the 
Imbens et al. (2001) study on lottery players; this disparity may be explained in part by 
the difference in the populations analyzed. 
                                                 
29 The effects of demographic characteristics on retirement are well established in the economic literature.  
See Blau (1994) or Peracchi and Welch (1994) for a discussion of these effects.   
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Having established that the effect of wealth on the LFP choice of older men is not 
trivial, I now ask whether recent trends in the housing market have affected household 
wealth by enough to have had an important effect on LFP rates among older men.  I use 
my estimates to assess the impact of the recent run-up (bubble?) in housing prices in the 
U.S.  Figure 1.2 shows that growth in housing prices over the past decade has been 
astounding.  After cumulative growth of 6.5% between 1975 and 1995, the average real 
price of housing increased by over 50% between 1995 and 2005.   I conduct a 
counterfactual experiment in which house price appreciation from 1995-2005 is assumed 
to have occurred at the “normal” rate rather than the unusually high rate actually 
observed.  I define the “normal” return on housing to be 0.5 percent annually, which is 
slightly more than the average real appreciation rate of housing in the U.S. between 1975 
and 1995.30  Results are presented in Figure 1.3.  The effect of the housing wealth boom 
is apparent in Figure 1.3(a): counterfactual wealth in the year 2004 is $213k, 13% lower 
than the actual level of wealth.  Figure 1.3(b) presents counterfactual LFP rates based on 
OLS and TSLS coefficient estimates relative to actual LFP rates.  The TSLS results 
imply that the LFP rate would have been 1.3 percentage points (or 4%) higher in 2004 if 
the extraordinary gains in housing prices had not occurred.   
Was this estimated 1.3 percentage point reduction in the older male LFPR due to 
the housing market boom a large effect?  There is no definitive answer to this question, 
but one comparison suggests not.  Copeland (2003) estimates that a 1 percentage point 
increase in LFP among men and women aged 55 to 64 would improve the 75-year 
actuarial balance of Social Security by less than 4%.  The boom in housing prices over 
                                                 
30 Specifically, counterfactual wealth for person i in year t is: 
( )( ))1()005.1( 10 itititit hpi wealthhousing wealthhousingnon wealthtualcounterfac +++−=  
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the past decade was the largest recorded in U.S. history, yet Copeland’s result suggests 
that the resulting 1.3 percentage point drop in LFP reduced the fiscal balance of Social 
Security by a tiny amount compared to the magnitude of the imbalance.31   
Why isn’t the effect of wealth on retirement larger?  One explanation is that men 
may choose to spend their wealth gains on increased consumption of goods and services 
rather than increased consumption of leisure.  This may be particularly likely if 
institutional rigidities in the labor market limit an older man’s consumption of leisure.  
There is some evidence of this in the literature.  For example, Rust and Phelan (1997) 
show that age specific Social Security and Medicare incentives affect age at retirement, 
particularly for liquidity constrained individuals.  Khitatrakun (2004) finds that age 
eligibility rules associated with defined benefit pension plans dampened the impact of 
stock market gains on the expected timing of retirement among older stockholders in the 
HRS.   
An alternative way to characterize the wealth effect on retirement is the Marginal 
Propensity to Consume leisure (MPCleisure) from an increase in wealth.  The MPCleisure 
measures the fraction of a $1 increase in wealth that an older man consumes through 
reduced labor earnings.  I use my estimate of the wealth effect on LFP to compute the 
MPCleisure under the following assumptions:  (1) A man can choose only to participate or 
not participate in the labor force in each year, and he cannot adjust his hours of work; (2) 
if the man does participate in the labor force, he earns a salary of $36k, the mean annual 
                                                 
31 The actuarial balance of Social Security is the difference between payroll tax income and the cost of the 
program expressed as a percentage of taxable payroll over the 75-year evaluation period.  Over the 75-year 
period 2005 – 2080, the present value unfunded obligation of Social Security is projected to be $4.6 trillion, 
representing 1.9 percent of taxable payroll and 0.7 percent of GDP over the 75-year period (source: 2006 
OASDI Trustees Report, Social Security Administration).  A 4% improvement in the 75-year actuarial 
balance would reduce the present value unfunded obligation of Social Security by $184 billion over the 
period 2005 – 2080.  
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salary of men aged 55 to 60 who are working in my sample.32  My estimates imply that a 
$100k increase in wealth reduces labor earnings by $1,700 on average – the product of 
the predicted change in LFP (-0.047 percentage points) and the annual wage ($36k).  
Thus my estimate of MPCleisure is 0.017.  This estimate is of the same order of magnitude 
as Cheng and French (2000) and Imbens et al. (2001).33   
The economic literature provides a range of estimates of the Marginal Propensity 
to Consume goods and services (MPCgoods) among households in the U.S.  Here I focus 
on papers that estimate MPCgoods on a population of older workers, who are more likely 
to also be considering retirement.  Lehnert (2004) estimates MPCgoods at 0.08 for 
households between the ages 52 to 62, and at 0.03 for households older than 62 years of 
age.  Li and Yao (2005) estimate MPCgoods at 0.06 among households in their 50s, and 
Morris (2006) estimates MPCgoods at 0.13 for households 50 and older.  Each of these 
estimates is substantially higher than my estimate of MPCleisure, which implies that a 
typical older man is much more likely to adjust his consumption of goods and services 
than his consumption of leisure in response to an exogenous increase in wealth.  Given 
the labor market incentives that older men face, this implies that tastes for consumption at 
older ages are “stronger” than tastes for leisure.   
1.5.3  Robustness  
As a check on the robustness of my findings, I examined a number of alternative 
specifications.  I briefly summarize the results here. 
                                                 
32 I limit the sample to ages 55 to 60 to limit possible bias from self selection into retirement. Most men do 
not retire before age 60.   
33 Cheng and French (2002) estimate the MPCleisure from a gain in wealth at 0.02.  In the Imbens et al. 
(2002), lottery winnings are paid out annually over a 20-year period.   Imbens et al. (2001) find that men 
aged 55 to 65 consume 16 cents of every dollar received from the annual lottery payout.  By computing the 
present discounted value of the annuitized lottery payout (assuming a 5% discount rate), their results imply 
that MPCleisure from a gain in wealth is 0.013.   
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I repeated the analysis using two alternative measures of retirement:  full-time 
work and self-assessed retirement status.  The IV results were qualitatively similar in 
each case.  A $100k increase in wealth was estimated to reduce the probability of 
working full-time by 2.1 percentage points and self-assessed non-retirement by 2.7 
percentage points, and the estimates were significantly different from zero.  I also 
estimated the model on a sample that is limited to men who were labor force participants 
in the previous period.  Thus the coefficient estimate on wealth can be interpreted as the 
effect of wealth on the rate of transition out of the labor force.  The estimates indicated 
that an increase in wealth leads to an increased probability of labor force exit.  However, 
none of the TSLS estimates of the wealth effect on LFP were significantly different from 
zero, due in part to a reduction in sample size from 8021 to 3084 observations.   
I investigated whether my results were sensitive to the omission of men for whom 
data on HPI are not available.  I re-estimated the model on an expanded sample where 
these men were included, and where an “HPI_missing value” indicator was added to the 
specification.  The wealth effect estimates in this case were virtually identical to those 
reported above. 
There is some evidence that among married couples, the retirement decision of 
the husband may be jointly determined with the retirement decision of his wife (e.g. 
Hurd, 1990; Blau, 1998).  The empirical model in this paper abstracts from this 
possibility.  I re-estimated the model with the wife’s personal characteristics and an 
indicator for the wife’s LFP status added to the specification.  For unmarried men these 
variables are set to 0 and missing value indicators are set to 1.  IV results using this 
approach were similar; a $100k increase in wealth reduces the probability of LFP by 4.2 
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percentage points.   
There is also evidence that the market for housing is not efficient; i.e. that current 
returns are correlated with past returns (Case and Shiller, 1989).34  Thus men who 
experience relatively large increases in HPI may also expect higher rates of return on 
their housing assets and higher levels of future wealth.  I omit expectations over future 
wealth from my empirical specification.  If the man’s current level of wealth is not a 
sufficient statistic for expected future wealth, then the HPI may be correlated with the 
disturbance term in the LFP equation and its use as an instrument is tenuous.  To address 
this issue I added current and lagged values of 1 year house price appreciation rates to the 
specification.  IV estimates of the wealth effect from this specification were quite similar.   
A potential problem with my analysis is that the empirical specification imposes 
the restriction that the wealth effect on LFP is linear and does not vary across different 
segments of the population.  This may be an important limitation.  For example, the 
wealth effect on LFP may be decreasing in the man’s level of wealth.  As the level of 
wealth increases and permanent income rises, an exogenous increase in wealth constitutes 
a smaller shock to permanent income.  To examine this possibility I estimated a model in 
which a quadratic term for wealth was included in the specification.  IV point estimates 
indicated that the magnitude of the wealth effect changes very little with level of wealth.  
I also estimated a model in which wealth was interacted with an indicator for whether the 
man holds a college degree, because college educated men have higher levels of 
permanent income on average.  If the wealth effect is decreasing in permanent income, 
the sign of the coefficient estimate on the interaction term should be positive.  The TSLS 
                                                 
34 I regressed 1 year house price appreciation rates on lagged 1 year house price appreciation rates for the 
men in my sample.  The R-squared from this regression was over 40%.   
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point estimates were consistent with this hypothesis, indicating that college educated men 
are 1.3 percentage points more likely to participate in the labor force in response to a 
$100k increase in wealth.  However, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term was 
not significantly different than zero.  
The effect on LFP of an exogenous wealth shock may also be increasing in age, as 
older men have less remaining life over which to finance consumption.  To address this 
possibility I added an interaction term between age and wealth to the model.  If the 
wealth effect on retirement is larger for an older man, the coefficient on the interaction 
term should be negative.  The TSLS point estimates were consistent with this hypothesis, 
although the age gradient was small and the coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
was not significantly different from zero.  The point estimate indicated that for each year 
of age, a $100k increase in wealth reduces the probability of LFP by an additional 0.08 
percentage points.   
 
1.6  Conclusions 
In this paper I find that an increase in wealth leads to earlier withdrawal from the 
labor force among older men, consistent with the assumption that leisure is a normal 
good.  My IV estimates indicate that a $20k increase in wealth reduces the probability of 
LFP by about 1 percentage point.  Previous estimates from studies in which wealth was 
assumed to be exogenous implied that the wealth effect was very small and not 
statistically different from zero.  These estimates are likely biased toward zero due to 
measurement error and to the endogeneity of wealth.  My OLS estimates suggest that 
failure to control for these factors leads to estimates of the wealth effect that are 
31 
understated by a factor of at least 2.   
 I find no evidence against the hypothesis that the effects of housing and non-
housing wealth on LFP are equal, although the power of my test is low.  Thus, my 
analysis suggests that older men are equally willing to “spend” housing and non-housing 
wealth on leisure.   
I use my estimates to examine the impact of the boom in housing prices in the 
U.S. over the past decade on the LFP rate of older men.  I find that the “excess” growth in 
housing prices led to an increase in wealth of 13% on average compared to a hypothetical 
scenario in which housing prices increased at a more normal rate.  If this gain in wealth 
had not occurred, my estimates suggest that the LFP rate of men between the ages of 63 
and 72 would have been 1.3 percentage points (or 4%) higher in 2004.  This is a 
relatively small effect, considering that the growth in housing prices over this time period 
was larger than at any time in recorded U.S. history.  Thus my estimates suggest that, 
given the modest effect of wealth on the LFP decisions of older men, the scale of macro-
economic shocks to wealth (such as the potential housing price meltdown in coming 
years) is not large enough to have an important effect on aggregate labor supply patterns 
of older men.  
One reason why the effect of wealth on LFP is not larger is that older men 
apparently prefer to spend an increase in wealth on consumption of goods and services 
instead of earlier retirement.  This may be a result of institutional rigidities in the labor 
market that affect older men, such as age-specific Social Security and pension incentives.  
The labor force attachment of older women and younger married women may be weaker 
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than for older men.  Thus the wealth effect on LFP rates may be more substantial for 
these populations.  This may be a topic worth exploring in future research.  
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Table 1.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Labor Force Outcomes
Labor Force Participation 0.478 0.500
Full-Time Work 0.362 0.481
Not Retired (Self-assessed) 0.511 0.500
Personal Characteristics
Age 63.0 4.2
HS Degree 0.344 0.475
Some College 0.196 0.397
College Degree 0.210 0.407
Hispanic 0.111 0.315
Black 0.177 0.382
Married 0.770 0.421
Bad Health 0.270 0.444
Homeowner 0.814 0.389
Local Economic Conditions
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.16 2.19
Per Capita Income 24.2 4.8
Manual Labor Share 0.469 0.080
Inheritance Expectations (Lagged)
Missing Inheritance Expectations 0.150 0.357
Expect Inheritance (0 or 1) 0.293 0.455
Inheritance Probability (0% to 100%) 0.156 0.310
Expected Inheritance Amount 68.3 195.1
Expected Inheritance Amount Missing 0.018 0.134
Mother has No HS degree 0.623 0.485
Number of Living Parents 0.333 0.545
Married 0.751 0.432
Spouse's Mother Has No HS Degree 0.448 0.497
Spouse's Number of Living Parents 0.419 0.638
Notes on Table 1.1:
8021 observations for all variables except for "Expected Inheritance Amount" (2198 observations).  "Expect 
Inheritance" is equal to 1 if the individual reports a positive probability of receiving an inheritance in the next 10 years 
(i.e. Inheritance Probability > 0), and 0 otherwise.  "Expected Inheritance Amount" is the dollar value of the expected 
inheritance condtitional on expecting an inheritance.  All dollar amounts expressed in units of 1,000 1992 dollars.
 
 
 Table 1.2  Wealth Holdings and Instruments for Wealth 
 
Std.
Variable Mean Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Wealth Holdings
Total Wealth 210.3 338.4 1.3 35.0 107.6 249.6 514.8
Housing Wealth 76.0 85.8 0.0 13.4 58.1 107.6 172.1
Non-Housing Wealth 134.3 290.7 0.0 4.9 35.9 138.6 370.3
Instruments for Wealth
HPI (10 Year Change) 0.148 0.245 -0.132 -0.023 0.104 0.288 0.505
Received Inheritance (last 2 yrs) 0.035 0.183 0 0 0 0 0
Inheritance Amount (last 2 yrs) 82.0 163.1 3.8 8.9 29.5 77.5 172.1
Received Inheritance (since 1994) 0.146 0.354 0 0 0 0 1
Inheritance Amount (since 1994) 79.8 163.0 2.9 8.3 26.8 89.2 156.2
Notes on Table 1.2:
Percentiles
8021 observations on all variables except for "Inheritance Amount (last 2 years)" and "Inheritance Amount (since 1994)", on which there are 
275 and 1175 observations, respectively.  "Received Inheritance (last 2 years)" and "Received Inheritance (since 1994)" is the dollar value of 
all inheritances received over the period specified, conditional on receiving at least 1 inheritance.  All dollar amounts expressed in units of 
1,000 1992 dollars.
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Table 1.3  Effect of the 10-year Change in Housing Price on Wealth and LFP 
 
Ownership Type
Home Owners 1.278 *** -0.069 *
(N = 6527) (0.317) (0.040)
Non Home Owners -0.231 0.001
(N = 1494) (0.367) (0.080)
Notes on Table 1.3:
OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by individual.  All specifications include 
fixed effects for age and year, and controls for personal characteristics, local 
economic condiitons, and lagged inheritance expectations.  * indicates significance at 
the 10% level  (** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level).  
       LFP
Dependent Variable
   Total Wealth
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4   First Stage Estimates on Identifying Instruments, 
 Dependent Variable is Total Wealth 
 
Identifying Instruments
HPI 1.0153 *** 0.9718 *** 0.9909 ***
(0.2778) (0.2817) (0.2794)
Inheritances (Last 2 yrs) 0.8957 * 0.8807 *
(0.4686) (0.4726)
Inheritances (since 1994) 0.7341 *** 0.7275 ***
(0.2285) (0.2298)
F Statistic 13.36 3.65 10.32 9.92 12.89
Notes on Table 1.4:
Specification
Standard errors clustered by individual, 8021 observations.  Wealth includes both housing and non-housing wealth, 
and is measured in 100,000 1992 dollars.  All specifications include fixed effects for age and year, and also control for 
personal characteristics, local economic conditions, and lagged inheritance expectations.  Specifications (3) and (5) 
also include subjective inheritance expectations as of 1994.  F statistic is from a joint test of the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient estimates on the identifying instruments are equal to zero.
(4) (5)(1) (2) (3)
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Table 1.5  Estimates of the Wealth Effect on LFP, Alternative Specifications 
 
Instruments
(a)  Instruments are HPI and Inheritance Receipts in Past 2 Years
Coefficient -0.0153 *** -0.0586 -0.0312 -0.0389 **
Std. Err. (0.0027) (0.0372) (0.0198) (0.0185)
Over ID Test -     -     -     0.5277
(b)  Instruments are HPI and Cumulative Inheritance Receipts since 1994
Coefficient -0.0153 *** -0.0558 -0.0439 *** -0.0454 ***
Std. Err. (0.0027) (0.0355) (0.0164) (0.0152)
Over ID Test -     -     -     0.7583
Notes on Table 1.5:
Standard errors clustered by individual, 8021 observations.  Wealth includes both housing and non-housing 
wealth, and is measured in units of 100,000 1992 dollars.  Specifications vary along 2 dimensions:  the 
identifying assumption and the instruments used.  In Column 1 wealth is assumed to be exogenous and the 
wealth effect is estimated using OLS.  In Columns 2-4, wealth is assumed to be endogenous and the 
wealth effect is estimated using TSLS, where wealth is instrumented with measures of house prices (2), 
inheritances (3), and both (4).  In section (a), the measure for house prices is the HPI and the measure for 
inheritances is the value of inheritance receipts from the past 2 years.  In section (b), the measure for 
house prices is HPI and the measure for inheritances is cumulative inheritances received since 1994.  All 
specifications include fixed effects for age and year, and also control for personal characteristics, local 
economic conditions, and lagged inheritance expectations.  The specification in section (b) also controls for 
inheritance expectations as of 1994. 
Identifying Assumption
(1) OLS
None
(2) TSLS
House Prices
(3) TSLS
Inheritances
(4) TSLS
Both
* indicates significance at the 10% level  (** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level).  Over ID Test is the p-
value on a Sargan-Hansen test of the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e. uncorrelated 
with the error term), and that the instruments are correctly excluded from the retirement equation.    
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Table 1.6  Estimates of Housing vs. Non-housing Wealth Effect on LFP  
 
(1) OLS (2) TSLS
Housing Wealth -0.0328 *** -0.0863
(0.0106) (0.1281)
Non Housing Wealth -0.0125 *** -0.0292
(0.0031) (0.0533)
Test:  housing effect = non-housing wealth effect
0.0449 0.8087
Notes on Table 1.6:
Specification
In specification 1 housing and non-housing wealth are assumed to be exogenous, and their effects on LFP 
are estimated using OLS.  In specification 2 housing and non-housing wealth are assumed to be endogenous 
and their effects are estimated using 2SLS, where wealth is instrumented with HPI and Cumulative 
Inheritance Receipts since 1994.  All specifications include fixed effects for age and year, and control for 
personal characteristics, local economic conditions, and lagged inheritance expectations.  Standard errors 
clustered by individual, 8021 observations.* indicates significance at the 10% level  (** at the 5% level; *** at 
the 1% level).  Wealth is measured in units of 100,000 of 1992 dollars.  "Test: housing = non-housing wealth" 
is the p-value from an F test on the equality of coefficients on housing and non-housing wealth.
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Figure 1.1  LFPR by Age       
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Figure 1.2  Real Housing Prices in the U.S. by Year35 
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35 Source:  OFHEO House Price Index adjusted for inflation using CPI less shelter for all urban consumers. 
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Figure 1.3 Counterfactual Simulation:  The Effect of Housing Price  
 Increases on LFP of Older Men by Year 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
CAN SOCIAL SECURITY EXPLAIN TRENDS IN LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION OF OLDER MEN IN THE UNITED STATES? 
 
(co-authored with David Blau) 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
The Labor Force Participation Rate (LFPR) of older men in the United States 
declined for much of the twentieth century.  The magnitude and duration of this trend is 
remarkable.  The LFPR of men aged 65 and older fell from 68% in 1900 to 19% in 1980 
(Moen, 1987).  However, this long downward trend ended in the 1980s. More recently, 
the LFPR of men in some age groups began to rise.  For example, after falling to a 20th 
century low of 24% in 1985, the LFPR of men aged 65 to 69 increased to over 33% in 
2005.  The participation rate for men aged 60 to 64 increased from 55% in 1985 to 58% 
in 2005 (see Figure 2.1).  The U.S. population will be aging rapidly in the next two 
decades and beyond, so it is important to understand why the downward trend in the 
LFPR of older men ended, and whether the recent increases are likely to persist. 
The goal of this paper is to quantitatively assess the impact of changes in the rules 
governing Social Security retirement and disability benefits on trends in older male LFP.  
We also examine the role of changes in lifetime earnings, wage rates, and the 
demographic composition of the older male population, particularly the dramatic increase 
in educational attainment.  We combine data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the Social Security 
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Administration (SSA) to generate a synthetic panel data set spanning the period 1962 to 
2005.  Individual-level data from the CPS and SIPP are aggregated into cells defined by 
defined by calendar year, age, and education, and merged, along with aggregate data 
from the SSA.   
A priori, changing Social Security rules is the most plausible explanation for the 
observed trends in LFPR.  The generosity of benefits was increased often from the 
inception of Social Security in 1935 through the early 1970s, coinciding with declining 
LFP of older men.  Further, the decline accelerated as the rate of growth in Social 
Security benefit generosity increased from the mid 1960s through the mid 1970s.  The 
downward trend in LFP ended and reversed after several Social Security reforms 
increased the incentive to work at older ages.  Amendments in 1977 reduced benefits for 
men who turned 65 beginning in 1982.  The 1983 amendments increased the normal 
retirement age in two month increments per year from 65 in 1999 to 66 in 2005, 
effectively reducing lifetime benefits36.  The 1983 amendments also stipulated increases 
in the reward for delaying entitlement past the normal retirement age over the period 
1987 to 2005.  Finally, amendments in 1983 (effective in 1990) and in 2000 modified the 
Social Security Earnings Test, first reducing and then eliminating the implicit tax on 
earnings for men at and above the normal retirement age.  
A number of studies have analyzed the impact of changes in Social Security 
retirement and disability benefits on the older male LFPR in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Anderson, Gustman, and Steinmeier, 1999, Hurd and Boskin, 1984; Parsons, 1980; 
                                                 
36 A person who retires at the normal retirement age of 66 in 2005 collects benefits for a full year less than 
an equivalent individual who retired at the normal retirement age of 65 in 1999, holding constant life 
expectancy.  The reduction in lifetime benefits is also reflected in an increased penalty associated with 
claiming benefits before the normal retirement age.  A further phased increase in the normal retirement age 
from 66 to 67 is scheduled to take place from 2017-2022. 
42 
Moffitt, 1987; Bound, 1989; Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Stewart, 1995). More recently, 
Pingle (2006), Mastrobuoni (2006), Gustman and Steinmeier (2006), and others have 
analyzed the effects of the 1983 reforms.  An important contribution of our study is to 
assess the explanatory power of Social Security over a long period of time that 
encompasses many of the major changes to Social Security rules and in which there was 
a major reversal of the secular decline in the older male LFPR. This setting provides a 
challenge to any mono-causal explanation: such an explanation will have to account for 
many years of decline, and the recent increase.  
We specify an econometric model that can be interpreted as a linear 
approximation to the labor force participation decision rule implied by a life cycle 
economic model. We include calendar-year fixed effects in the model to control for 
secular trends and cyclical patterns in employment that might give rise to spurious 
correlation between trends in the explanatory factors and trends in LFP.  We include 
education group fixed effects in order to account for permanent unobserved differences 
across education groups in the relative attractiveness of employment at older ages.  And 
we use age fixed effects to account for features of Social Security and Medicare rules that 
provide strong age-specific employment incentives and that have remained mostly 
unchanged during the period covered by our data.  Despite all of these controls, 
unobserved differences across birth cohorts could give rise to spurious correlation 
between Social Security rule changes and employment trends.  Many of our explanatory 
variables vary by the interaction between birth cohort and education.  This makes it 
possible to control for birth cohort fixed effects that account for the influence of any 
unobserved birth-cohort-specific factors.  However, in practice identification is rather 
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tenuous with a full set of single-year-of-birth fixed effects, so we present results for 
several alternative specifications of birth year effects.  We assume that all two-way and 
higher-order interactions among calendar year, education, birth year, and age can be 
excluded from the model, and this assumption provides identification.37   
Our empirical results indicate that changes in Social Security can account for only 
a small proportion of the observed decline in LFP from the 1960s through the 1980s.  The 
results for Social Security are somewhat sensitive to the specification of birth year 
effects.  But even the specification without any birth year controls, which yields the 
biggest effects of Social Security, implies that changes in Social Security can explain 
only one fifth of the observed decline in LFP.  The specification with the richest controls 
for birth year in which Social Security effects are well determined (two-year birth cohort 
fixed effects) implies that Social Security changes can explain only 4% of the observed 
decline.  Another 5-7% of the decline is accounted for by the increased attractiveness of 
Social Security Disability Insurance.  The latter finding is quite robust.  Changes in 
lifetime earnings and wages contribute very little to explaining either the LFP decline or 
the later increase. 
Thus, changes in Social Security policy fail to account for the bulk of the decline 
in LFP from the 1960s through the 1980s.  By providing evidence against the most 
plausible explanation for the downward trend, our results imply that unobserved changes 
in preferences, constraints, and institutions are the driving forces.  This of course leaves 
open the question of what those unobserved changes were. 
                                                 
37 Birth year, age, and calendar year are of course collinear. We specify the model with nonlinear functions 
of these variables (fixed effects), so it is possible to include all three in the model. It would be inappropriate 
to give any particular interpretation to the effects of birth year, age, and birth year effects in this 
specification. This is not a problem, however, since they are included only to control for otherwise 
unobserved factors. 
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Our results do provide a more specific explanation for the recent increase in labor 
force participation: changes in the education composition of the older male population.  
Low-participating high school dropouts have been rapidly replaced in recent years by 
higher-participating college attendees, and college graduates.  This trend can explain the 
entire increase in LFP of older men in recent years, and the results are quite robust on this 
score.  However, this compositional effect is not a fundamental explanatory factor, and it 
will eventually end as the transition to a more educated labor force is completed.  Pingle 
(2006) finds that increases in the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) have played an 
important role in the recent increase in LFP of older men.  Our findings indicate that the 
increase in the DRC can explain 64% of the recent increase in older male LFP in a 
specification without birth cohort effects, but only 10% in a specification with two-year 
birth cohort effects.   Mastrobuoni (2006) finds that changes in the Normal Retirement 
Age (NRA) have also been an important cause of the rise in LFP. Our estimates suggest 
that the increased NRA played little or no role in explaining the rise in LFP.  Pingle and 
Mastrobuoni estimate the “treatment effects” of these changes, while our approach forces 
the effects of Social Security rules to operate through their impact on the Social Security 
benefit.  Mastrobuoni suggests that changes in the NRA may affect behavior through 
non-economic channels, by altering social norms or implicit advice from the government 
on when to retire.  Our approach does not pick up effects of Social Security that operate 
through such mechanisms. 
Section 2.2 provides information on the context of our study, and discusses the 
contributions of previous studies. Section 2.3 discusses the conceptual framework for the 
analysis and the empirical specification implied by the framework. Section 2.4 describes 
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the data, section 2.5 discusses the results, and section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2  Background 
As noted above, circumstantial evidence suggests that changes in the generosity 
and structure of Social Security may have affected labor force behavior of older men.  
However, estimates of the effect of changes to Social Security on LFP of older men vary 
widely.  Moffitt (1987) uses time-series data to assess the impact of increases in benefits 
from the 1950s through the 1970s.  He concludes that unanticipated Social Security 
policy changes can explain no more than 20% of the observed decline in the 1970s.  In a 
similar analysis using a longer time-series, Stewart (1995) finds that up to 40% of the 
change in the LFPR of older men between 1965 and 1990 can be attributed to changes in 
Social Security benefits.  Researchers have also used individual-level panel data to assess 
the impact of particular SS amendments.  Hurd and Boskin (1984) find that increases in 
Social Security benefits between 1970 and 1972 account for nearly the entire decline in 
the LFPR of older men between 1969 and 1973.  Blau (1994) finds that changes in Social 
Security benefits can explain part of the decline in older male LFP in the 1970s, but the 
majority of the decline is unexplained.  Kreuger and Pischke (1992) use synthetic panel 
data and find that the 1977 amendments had almost no impact on LFP rates of older men 
in the 1970s and 1980s.  There is also disagreement over the role of Social Security 
Disability Insurance (SSDI) in explaining the decline in LFP at ages before eligibility for 
retirement benefits (Parsons, 1980; Bound, 1989). 
The LFPR of older men was declining for many years before the inception of 
Social Security (Costa, 1998).  This decline is not unique to the United States.  Similar 
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patterns are found in other industrialized countries, suggesting that the principal 
explanations for the trend toward earlier retirement may be common across developed 
nations.  One such explanation is that lifetime income has been rising as a result of 
growing real wages (Costa, 1998; Burtless and Quinn, 2000).  Other things equal, 
wealthier men have a higher lifetime demand for leisure, and can more readily “afford” to 
retire early.  However, the increase in the LFPR of older men since the late 1990s has 
occurred during a period when real earnings have continued to increase in the US, at least 
for some groups.   
Other proposed explanations for changing patterns of LFP at older ages include 
changes in the availability and structure of private pension plans (Friedberg and Webb, 
2005) and employer provided retiree health insurance (Blau and Gilleskie, 2001; 
Madrian, 1994).  We control for pension type in our analysis, but our data do not have the 
detailed information needed to measure pension incentives carefully. Hence, we do not 
make any claims about whether or not changes in pension coverage can explain trends in 
LFP.  Similarly, we control for retiree health insurance, but our measure is quite crude 
and we cannot credibly analyze the causal effect of changes in the availability of health 
insurance on employment.  
The LFPR of married women has nearly tripled since 1950 (Costa, 2000) and 
several studies have found that working husbands and wives tend to retire at the same 
time (e.g. Hurd, 1990; Blau, 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000).  If a husband values 
leisure more highly when it is shared with his spouse he may delay retirement until his 
wife, who is typically younger, becomes eligible for Social Security or pension benefits. 
The connection between increasing LFP of older married women and the recent increase 
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for older men was analyzed by Schirle (2007), who found that about one quarter of the 
recent increase in older male LFP in the U.S. could be accounted for by growth in 
participation by older wives.  We account for increases in the LFPR of married women 
by including the wife’s wage offer in our model.    
Trends in the health of older men have been discounted as a potential explanation 
for the long run decline in the LFP rate of older men.  Health has a major impact on labor 
force behavior, but trends in health have been positive rather than negative in recent 
decades (Burtless and Quinn, 2000).  Nonetheless we control for health status in our 
analysis.   
 
2.3 Empirical Model 
 We specify an empirical model that can be interpreted as an approximation to the 
decision rule for employment at older ages implied by a life cycle model. Each period a 
man, and his wife if he is married, chooses consumption and labor force participation to 
maximize the expected present discounted value of remaining lifetime utility, subject to a 
set of constraints.38  Utility is derived from leisure and consumption, and preferences may 
depend on individual characteristics such as age, health, race, marital status, and 
education. The constraints include Social Security and pension rules, wage offer 
functions, net worth, and the rate of return on assets. The labor force participation 
decision is made by comparing the maximized value of discounted utility from working 
                                                 
38 We focus on behavior at older ages, rather than attempting to model the full life cycle, as in French 
(2005) and Moffitt (1987).  Hours of work of men are clustered around full-time hours (approximately 
2000 per year) and to a lesser extent part-time or part-year hours (approximately 1000 per year) (Rust, 
1990).  At younger ages there is very little non-participation by men. Withdrawal from the labor force at 
older ages typically involves an abrupt transition from full time or part time to zero hours of work, and 
understanding this behavior is unlikely to be aided by analysis of hours of work choices at younger ages. 
Moffitt’s (1987) evidence suggests that younger men do not take account of Social Security and pension 
incentives that will affect their standard of living far in the future when they are retired. 
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and not working, given expectations about future realizations of random variables. Now 
consider how to derive a useful empirical approximation to the decision rule for labor 
force participation.  We discuss Social Security, pensions and health insurance, wage 
rates, and assets, in turn. 
 1. Social Security. The parameters of the Social Security system, together with an 
individual’s average lifetime earnings and beliefs about future benefit rules, wages, 
health, and mortality fully characterize Social Security benefits in the model. We 
approximate the effects of Social Security rules with a small number of variables 
measuring the benefit that an individual would receive as a result of following a specified 
sequence of labor supply choices and exiting the labor force at a specified age, 
conditional on experiencing a specified earnings sequence. There is an infinite number of 
such Social Security benefit variables, depending on the labor supply and wage 
sequences specified, but they are all highly correlated since they depend on the same 
underlying rules. We use the following variables as “approximately sufficient statistics” 
for the effect of Social Security on LFP:39 
 (a) SSBNRA, the retirement benefit an individual would receive at the normal 
retirement age (NRA) if he were to work full time in every year from the age of labor 
force entry through age NRA-1 at the mean of his age-specific wage offer distribution, 
                                                 
39 Many studies of the effect of Social Security on retirement convert the monthly benefit into a stock of 
“Social Security wealth” using an assumed interest rate and mortality schedule.  This approach is based on 
the assumption of a perfect capital market.  This is not a very appealing assumption in the context of Social 
Security, given that a liquidity constraint is the only plausible reason for the large spike in labor force exit 
at the earliest entitlement age.  Using the benefit instead of a wealth measure means that the coefficient 
estimate captures the effects of liquidity constraints, discounting, and mortality expectations, as well as 
retirement incentive effects.  This should be kept in mind when interpreting the estimates.  We discuss 
below alternative specifications using Social Security wealth.  Other studies use the replacement rate (the 
benefit divided by earnings) as an explanatory variable to capture the effect of Social Security.  We include 
the wage offer, thus implicitly accounting for the replacement rate. 
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and were to leave employment at age NRA and never work again.40  SSBNRA varies 
across individuals only as a result of differences in the rules in effect for different birth 
cohorts and differences in lifetime earnings across birth cohorts and education groups. 
This variable is intended to capture the wealth effect of Social Security (Moffitt, 1987), 
so we expect it to have a negative effect on LFP.  In order to isolate the effects of rule 
changes from lifetime earnings changes, we include in the model the average lifetime 
earnings implied by the assumed age-specific earnings sequence. 
 (b) SSB62, the retirement benefit the individual would receive at age 62 (the 
earliest age at which the Social Security retirement benefit can be claimed) if he were to 
work full time from the age of labor force entry through age 61 at the mean of his age-
specific wage offer distribution, leave employment at age 62, and never work again. This 
variable is intended to capture the effect of the early retirement penalty. In order to 
facilitate this interpretation, it is specified in differenced form as SSB62-SSBNRA.  A 
higher value of the variable implies a smaller early retirement penalty, so it should have a 
negative effect on labor force participation. 
 (c) SSB70, the retirement benefit the individual would receive at age 70 if he were 
to work full time through age 69 at the mean of his age-specific wage offer distribution, 
leave employment at age 70, and never work again.  Since the 1983 Social Security 
amendments, there has been no increase in the benefit for delaying retirement past age 
70.  This variable picks up the effect of the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC), which 
rewards later claiming with higher benefits. It is specified in differenced form as SSB70-
SSBNRA.  A higher value implies a larger incentive to delay retirement, so it should have 
                                                 
40 The normal retirement age is 65 for individuals born in or before 1937; 65 + x/6 for birth years 1937+x, 
x=1,...,5; 66 for birth years 1943-1954; 66 + x/6 for birth years 1954+x, x=1,...,5; and 67 for birth years 
1960+. 
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a positive effect on the LFPR.41 
 (d) SSBtd, the Social Security disability benefit the individual would receive in 
period t if he were to work full time through age t-2 at the mean of his age-specific wage 
offer distribution, withdraw from the labor force at age t-1, and become eligible for SSDI 
at age t. The requirement of not working at age t-1 is intended to capture the waiting 
period, which in reality is five months. SSBtd is zero from the NRA onward, because the 
SSDI benefit is converted to an OASI benefit at the NRA. This variable is intended to 
capture the incentive effects of SSDI benefits, and is expected to have a negative effect 
on LFP.42 
 This specification captures the main labor force participation incentives of Social 
Security: the wealth effect, the early retirement penalty, the delayed retirement credit, and 
the SSDI incentive effect.43  It does not account for several other channels through which 
Social Security might affect retirement decisions. The most important omitted channels 
are the Social Security Earnings Test (SSET), spouse benefits, and the payroll tax. The 
                                                 
41 It is worth noting that a standard life cycle model implies that benefits available conditional on retirement 
at alternative ages should affect LFP at a given age.  Thus, for example, the benefit available conditional on 
exit from the labor force at age 70 will affect the retirement decision at age 55.  The model does not 
condition on past labor force participation, nor does it assume that exit from the labor force is irreversible. 
However, the life cycle model also implies that the effect of the benefit available at a given age will differ 
depending on the individual’s current age. We do not allow for this in our main specification, but we 
discuss results from such a specification below. 
42
A higher SSDI benefit increases the incentive to apply for SSDI and withdraw from the labor force, 
conditional on health. Many SSDI applications are denied, so the coefficient on SSBtd picks up both the 
incentive effect and the cost of applying for SSDI given that the application may be unsuccessful. See 
Autor and Duggan (2003), Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), and Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) for recent 
analyses of SSDI. 
43 We investigated whether the Social Security variables described above are “approximately sufficient 
statistics” for the effects of Social Security by computing other Social Security benefit variables, assuming 
different earnings paths and different ages of entitlement. We regressed each of these other variables on the 
three retirement benefit variables described above and the associated average lifetime earnings.  For 
benefits available at alternative claiming ages using the same earnings history, the R2 exceeded 0.99 in 
every case.  For benefits based on alternative earnings histories with a similar lifetime average value but a 
different slope, the R2 was in the range 0.91 to 0.95.  For benefits based on alternative earnings histories 
with lower or higher lifetime average value, the R2 was in the range 0.80 to 0.95.  Thus, the Social Security 
variables included in the specification capture most of the variation in Social Security rules. 
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SSET imposes a tax on benefits for each dollar of earnings above a specified threshold, 
but repays the benefits lost due to the earnings test when the individual’s earnings 
subsequently drop below the threshold. The SSET has been found to have moderate labor 
supply effects on affected individuals (those who would work in the absence of the 
SSET), but affected individuals are in practice a small share of the older population 
(Friedberg, 2000; Burtless and Moffitt, 1985).  We ignore it here because there is no 
straightforward way to measure its effect in our framework.   
A married man’s wife is eligible for a Social Security benefit based either on her 
own earnings record or her husband’s earnings record, depending on which provides the 
larger benefit. While it is reasonable to specify Social Security benefits for men based on 
the assumption of continuous full time employment for many years, this assumption 
would not be reasonable for married women. In the absence of longitudinal data on the 
earnings histories of wives, there is no straightforward way to compute a reasonable 
approximation to the benefit for which a spouse would be eligible, so we omit spouse 
benefits.44 
Finally, we do not model the Social Security payroll tax, which is a proportional 
levy on covered earnings up to a maximum taxable amount.  The only variation in the tax 
rate in a given year is that the marginal rate is zero for men whose earnings are above the 
taxable maximum.  Given our focus on Social Security benefits computed at mean 
earnings, this source of variation is irrelevant because mean earnings are below the 
                                                 
44
Labor force participation of married women increased substantially during the period covered by our 
analysis, so the wives of more recent cohorts of married men are more likely to qualify for a benefit based 
on their own earnings history rather than the husband’s earnings history.  Thus it would be quite misleading 
to assume that all wives receive a spouse benefit rather than a benefit based on their own earnings record. 
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taxable maximum for nearly every cell in our data45.  Time series variation in the payroll 
tax is not cohort-specific, and is picked up by calendar year effects.  We discuss below 
the sensitivity of our results to ignoring taxes. 
 2. Pensions and health insurance. We have data on coverage by Defined Benefit 
and Defined Contribution pension plans, but we do not observe the rules or the variables 
that determine benefits (job tenure, average earnings at the pension job, the DC account 
balance). Similarly, we observe whether an individual is covered by an employer-
provided health insurance plan with retiree benefits, but we do not observe the associated 
rules or state variables. We include the coverage variables as crude controls for trends in 
pensions and health insurance, but we do not claim to capture the incentive effects of 
these potentially important factors. 
 3. Wage rates. We observe the wage rate for an individual only if he or she 
chooses to work. To circumvent this problem, we use the fitted value from a birth-year-
sex-education-specific log wage regression on age, race, marital status, region, and 
metropolitan status. These regressions are not corrected for selection on unobservables, 
since there is no plausible source of identification. The Appendix describes the regression 
specification in more detail.  The predicted value of the man’s log wage offer, and, if he 
is married, the spouse’s predicted log wage offer, are included in the labor force 
participation model. 
 4. Net worth. We lack data on net worth for most of our sample, so it is not 
feasible to include net worth in the analysis. This is a significant limitation of our 
specification, although in practice most studies of retirement have found a very small 
effect of net worth (e.g. Blau, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1984).  However, if most 
                                                 
45 Mean annual earnings are greater than the maximum taxable earnings for some cohorts from 1960-1972.   
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wealth accumulation results from saving out of earnings, average lifetime earnings may 
pick up the effect of net worth.  We discuss below the robustness of the results to controls 
for wealth proxies. 
 In order to facilitate aggregation, we specify a linear model for individual labor 
force participation.  We aggregate the data within cells defined by calendar year, single 
year of age, and four categories of educational attainment (high school dropout, high 
school graduate, some college, and college graduate).  The dependent variable is the labor 
force participation rate, and the explanatory variables are Social Security benefits, 
lifetime average earnings, pension and EPRHI coverage, wage rates, health status, marital 
status, and race.   
As noted above, we also include fixed effects for calendar year, age, education, 
and alternative controls for birth year.  Social Security rules generally vary only across 
birth cohorts for a given age at claiming, but lifetime earnings used to compute benefits 
vary across education groups. This makes it feasible to identify Social Security effects 
even with controls for birth year. However, including birth cohort controls changes the 
source of identification from cross-birth-cohort variation in rules to within-birth-cohort 
variation in lifetime earnings by education. This is not an innocuous difference, and 
certainly affects the interpretation of the estimates. The purpose of controlling for birth 
cohort is to guard against the possibility of unobserved changes in preferences, 
constraints, or institutions across birth cohort that might have influenced retirement 
behavior. Nevertheless, we recognize that this may be problematic in practice, so we 
present estimates both with and without birth year controls.  
An important issue for identification and interpretation is how to model 
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expectations about Social Security rule changes.  Krueger and Pischke (1992) assume 
myopic expectations in their analysis of the 1977 reform, arguing that because this reform 
unexpectedly reduced benefits after a long series of previous benefit increases, it is 
unlikely that the benefit reduction was foreseen by individuals.  This may be a reasonable 
assumption for the 1977 reform, but the assumption of myopia is less tenable in years 
prior to 1977.  There were eight changes to Social Security rules between 1961 and 1975, 
each increasing the generosity of benefits.  We conduct our analysis under two alternative 
extreme assumptions: perfect foresight and complete myopia.  We cannot defend either 
assumption as appropriate for the entire period of our analysis, but we can determine how 
sensitive the results are to these alternative assumptions.46 
 
2.4  Data 
We estimate the econometric model on a synthetic panel data set constructed from 
micro data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), combined with aggregate data from the Social Security 
Administration (SSA).  Individual records on men aged 55-69 from the CPS and SIPP are 
aggregated into cells defined by single year of birth, single year of age, and the four 
education groups defined above.  The aggregated data from the CPS and SIPP are merged 
at the cell level.  The result is a synthetic panel data set covering 58 birth years (1892 to 
1949) between 1962 and 2005, although no cohort has data for all of these years, and 
some cohorts are dropped due to small sample sizes.  Data from 1963 are dropped 
because there is no information on education in the 1963 CPS.  Because we focus on LFP 
                                                 
46 Moffitt (1987) specified a time series forecasting model of benefit changes in his analysis of the 1950s 
and 1960s.  We tried the same approach for our period, but the results yielded implausible forecasts, so we 
did not pursue this approach.   
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behavior at older ages, we include only cohorts that can be observed at ages 55 to 69 in 
our sample.  The estimation sample contains observations on 2,453 cells with at least 30 
observations per cell.  Cells with fewer than 30 observations are dropped.47 
Most of the data are from the March supplement to the CPS from 1962 to 2005.  
These data are used to construct measures of demographic characteristics, labor force 
participation, and wage rates of older men and their spouses.  Figure 2.2 shows the trend 
in the male LFPR at ages 55-69 averaged over all education groups for the period 1962-
2005.  A man is treated as a labor force participant if he worked or was actively searching 
for work (unemployed) in the week prior to the March survey.  The LFPR in this age 
range declined slowly in the 1960s, and then fell from over 70% in the early 1970s to 
55% in the mid 1980s.  The LFPR was essentially flat from the mid 1980s to the mid 
1990s, and then rose by about five percentage points after the mid 1990s.  Figure 2.3 
shows the trends for four age groups separately. The downward trend through the mid 
1980s was common to all of the age groups, but sharpest at the older ages.  And the 
rebound in LFP since the 1990s occurred only for the older groups (65-66 and 67-69). 
Trends in the education distribution of the older male population during this period are 
shown in Figure 2.4, which illustrates the rapid shift from a large majority of high school 
dropouts in 1962 to mainly high school graduates and college attendees today.  Figure 2.5 
shows that the LFPR is on average about 10 points lower for high school dropouts than 
for high school graduates.  Thus, educational composition effects may be important.   
Figure 2.6 shows the trend in bad health, based on CPS data.  We follow Peracchi 
                                                 
47 The CPS reports age at the survey date, but not birth year.  The majority of individuals interviewed in 
March will have their birthday later in the year.  For simplicity, we assume that all men have their birthday 
after the March survey date, implying that birth year = survey year minus age minus one.  Below, we 
discuss the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions about birth year.  Birth year is available in 
the SIPP. 
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and Welch (1994) in defining a man to be in bad health if he did not work full time in the 
survey reference week or in the previous year and he attributes that choice to disability.  
The CPS measure shows a decline in the incidence of poor health from 18-20% in the 
early 1970s to around 12% in the 1990s.  Because this measure depends on labor force 
status in previous periods it is likely to be endogenous with respect to LFP choice in the 
current period.  Figure 2.6 also shows the incidence of poor health for the same cohorts of 
men based on data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). The NHIS 
measure is derived from a question on general health status, with responses of fair and 
poor treated as “bad” and responses of good, very good, and excellent treated as “good.”  
Although the levels of the two measures differ, they follow the same trend over time. The 
NHIS measure is available only from the 1970s, so we use the CPS measure because it is 
available for the 1960s as well. 
We use data from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security 
Bulletin on average taxable earnings by cohort and age to construct measures of benefits.  
The published SSA data are combined with CPS earnings data to form earnings histories 
that are input to the ANYPIA benefit calculator provided by SSA to compute benefits. 
Details on the construction of the benefit measures are provided in the data appendix.  
Figure 2.7 illustrates trends in the real SSB for entitlement at ages 62, the NRA, and 70.  
SSBNRA follows an upward trend during the entire period, but with much slower growth 
in the 1980s than in other periods.  The SSB62 trend is parallel to the SSBNRA trend until 
the late 1990s, when it begins to diverge.  The divergence is due to the increase in the 
penalty for early retirement resulting from the increase in the NRA from 65 to 66.  SSB70 
rises relative to SSBNRA for most of the period, but the increase is especially notable in 
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the 1990s and 2000s as the increased DRC legislated in the 1983 reform is phased in.   
Figure 2.8 shows the trend in the SSDI benefit, averaged over ages 55-64 (SSDI 
eligibility ceases at the NRA). The trend is generally upward, but is more irregular than 
the retirement benefit trend because benefits are age-specific, and the rules used to 
compute the potential benefit are the same for all awardees in each year regardless of 
birth year.  The “notch” induced by the 1977 amendment is clearly visible in this case.  
Figure 2.9 shows trends in lifetime average monthly earnings by education group, and 
highlights the rapid growth in lifetime earnings disparity by education. 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show education-specific trends in predicted log real wage 
rates for men aged 55-69 and for wives of married men in this age range.  Real wages of 
older men and women have been stagnant or declining since the 1970s, and dispersion 
across education groups has increased. 
We use data from topical modules of various SIPP panels to measure participation 
in DB and DC pensions, and availability of EPRHI.  Respondents are asked if they are 
covered by EPRHI only if they are receiving income from a private pension at the time of 
the survey.  To deal with small sample sizes for early birth cohorts, our measures of 
pension participation and availability of EPRHI are averaged across the earliest birth 
years separately by education group.  Data for the earliest birth years likely suffer from 
mortality bias.  There may be additional biases for our measure of EPRHI, as individuals 
covered by EPRHI are more likely to be retired and receiving retirement income than 
those not covered by EPRHI.  Details on how DB, DC, and EPRHI indicators are 
constructed are included in the appendix. Figure 2.12 shows that for men aged 55-69 DB 
pension coverage trended upward until the 1980s and began to decline in the 1990s. DC 
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pension coverage increased slowly but steadily during the entire period. EPRHI coverage 
rose through the 1980s and has been roughly constant since then.  
 
2.5  Results  
2.5.1 Estimates 
Regression results are shown in Table 2.1 for several specifications of the LFPR 
model for men aged 55-69, using data from 1962 through 2005.  All specifications shown 
in Table 2.1 are based on the assumption of perfect foresight with respect to Social 
Security rules, and all include fixed effects for single years of age, single calendar years, 
and education groups.  The columns differ by how birth year effects are specified.48  The 
first specification has no controls for birth year, the second includes a quadratic birth year 
trend, the third includes dummies for five-year birth-cohort group effects, the fourth 
includes dummies for two-year birth-cohort group effects, and the last includes a full set 
of single-year-of-birth effects.  Figure 2.13 shows the actual and fitted trends in LFP for 
all of the specifications.  All specifications provide a good fit to the data, both overall, 
and by age group (not shown).  In fact, the alternative birth year specifications are 
virtually indistinguishable in terms of model fit.  The test statistics at the bottom of the 
columns of Table 2.1 indicate that the no-birth-year-effects model in column 1 is strongly 
rejected against the quadratic birth year specification (and against all of the other 
specifications; results not shown), while the two-year-birth-cohort specification in 
column 4 is not rejected against the specification with a full set of birth year fixed effects 
in column 5. 
                                                 
48 We also estimated specifications in which the calendar year fixed effects were replaced by a quadratic 
time trend. The main results were similar to those reported here, indicating that the results are not highly 
sensitive to the specification of time effects. 
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As discussed above, the Social Security benefit for retirement at the normal 
retirement age (SSBNRA) should capture the wealth effect of Social Security, so we expect 
it to have a negative effect on LFP.  The results confirm this expectation across all of the 
specifications except the last.  The magnitude of the effect declines across the columns of 
Table 2.1, as richer controls for birth year effects are added.  The coefficient estimate of -
0.21 in column 1 implies an elasticity of LFP with respect to SSBNRA of -0.41 at the 
means, compared to an elasticity of -0.10 for the estimate in column 4.  The gain in SSB 
from claiming at 62 rather than at the NRA is expected to have a negative effect on LFP.  
The coefficient estimate is negative in columns 1 and 3, but positive in columns 2, 4, and 
5.  The effects are small and insignificantly different from zero in the first four columns. 
The gain in SSB from claiming at 70 rather than at the NRA is predicted to have a 
positive effect on the LFPR, and the results in the first four columns confirm this.  The 
implied elasticity ranges from .07 in the first column to .02 in column 4, and the 
coefficient estimate is significantly different from zero in the first three columns.  The 
coefficient estimate on the SSDI benefit is negative, as expected, and is robust in 
magnitude and significantly different from zero in all specifications.  This variable varies 
by age as well as by birth year and education, and this additional variation seems to 
provide a robust source of identification.  The implied elasticity of the LFPR with respect 
to the SSDI benefit is -.10 at the means, based on the results in column 4.  Average 
lifetime monthly earnings (AME) is estimated to have a positive impact on LFP in the 
first four columns, significantly different from zero.  The sign of the AME effect on LFP 
is ambiguous in the context of our approximate decision rule specification; AME could 
capture a wealth effect, in which case we would expect a negative sign, but it could also 
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be correlated with higher future wages, implying a positive effect if the value of working 
in the future is positively associated with the value of working today.  The magnitude of 
the effect is robust across the first four specifications, and implies an elasticity of LFP in 
the range of 0.10 to 0.21. 
It is clear from the comparisons in Table 2.1 that identification of the effects of 
Social Security retirement benefits depends on the specification of birth cohort effects.  
Although all of the Social Security effects are identified in principle even with the 
inclusion of a full set of birth year fixed effects, there is insufficient variation in practice 
to permit reliable estimates with a full set of single-year birth cohort effects.49  We 
discount the results in the last column as implausible due to lack of identification, and in 
simulations discussed below we compare the results from the first four columns.  The fact 
that the specification in the fourth column, with two-year birth cohort effects, cannot be 
rejected against the specification in the last column provides justification for ignoring the 
results in the last column.  
An alternative approach to identification of the Social Security effects is to drop 
the assumption of perfect foresight.  As discussed above, it is difficult to determine an 
alternative to perfect foresight that would be a reasonable assumption over the entire 
1962-2005 period.  We report results based on an extreme alternative to perfect foresight, 
namely complete myopia.  The advantage of this assumption is that in some cases Social 
Security benefits vary by calendar year as well as birth year and education.  Table 2.2 
shows the coefficient estimates on the Social Security variables for the same five 
specifications as in Table 2.1, using the assumption of complete myopia to calculate 
benefits.  The results are surprising: all three SSB retirement variables have effects that 
                                                 
49 This pattern of findings persists in more parsimonious specifications that include only one SSB variable. 
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are the opposite of our expectations based on the model described above.  The effect of 
SSBNRA is positive and significantly different from zero in all five columns, with effect 
sizes that increase with richer controls for birth year.  The gain in SSB from retiring at 
age 70 instead of the NRA has a negative effect on LFP that increases in magnitude and 
becomes significantly different from zero as richer controls for birth year are added.  A 
higher age-62 benefit (which implies a smaller early retirement penalty) is associated 
with higher LFP, and the magnitude of the effect again increases across the columns.  
The effect of AME is also negative and robust across the columns.  The results for the 
SSB variables are difficult to interpret.  The assumption of myopia introduces an 
additional source of variation in the SSB variables: within-birth-cohort variation over 
time due to unanticipated benefit changes.  This yields more precise estimates, but the 
pattern of the effects is inconsistent with our expectations.  It is also difficult to 
understand why the effect sizes are larger with richer controls for birth year effects.  One 
possible explanation for these results is that there were many rule changes in the 1960s 
and early 1970s that increased the generosity of benefits.  Moffitt (1987) points out that 
the assumption of myopia during this period is rather implausible since it implies that 
each of the many changes is assumed to be the last one that will ever occur.  The same 
argument could be made for the 1980s as well.  Krueger and Pischke (1992) assume 
myopic expectations about Social Security rule changes, and they also find results that 
are quite sensitive to specification and often counterintuitive. 
The effects of other variables are less sensitive to the specification of birth year 
effects.  The own log-wage effects in Table 2.1 are positive, as expected, and 
significantly different from zero. The estimates imply an elasticity of LFP with respect to 
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the wage rate of about 0.20 at the observed mean LFPR of 0.608. The wife’s log-wage 
effect is also positive but quite small and insignificantly different from zero. Thus there is 
no evidence that rising wages of women have induced older men to remain in the labor 
force longer.  DB pension coverage is estimated to have very small and insignificant 
effects on LFP of older men.  DC pension coverage has a small positive effect on LFP, 
insignificantly different from zero.  EPRHI coverage has a very small effect on LFP in all 
specifications.  Bad health has a large and precisely estimated negative impact on LFP in 
all specifications, and the magnitude of the effect is robust across the columns.  Married 
and previously married men are much more likely to be in the labor force than their 
never-married counterparts. Education has positive but surprisingly small effects on LFP, 
compared to the large raw differences shown in Figure 2.5.  The large raw education gap 
in LFP is “accounted for” in the regression mainly by the wage rate.  There is no 
difference in the LFPR of black and white men after controlling for the other variables in 
the regression.  There is a 10 percentage point gap in the raw data in favor of whites, 
which is mainly accounted for by education.50 
2.5.2 Counterfactual Simulations 
The main issue of interest is whether the results can explain the observed LFP 
trends. We simulate several counterfactual experiments, in order to determine which, if 
any, of the explanatory variables can account for the trends. Figure 2.14 shows the result 
of an experiment in which Social Security retirement rules are fixed at their 1978 values 
                                                 
50In other specifications not reported here, we included the proportion of men working in manual 
occupations and the proportion self-employed, in order to determine whether physical demands of work at 
older ages and the greater control over working conditions provided by self-employment affect the LFPR.   
Manual workers are estimated to have a higher LFPR than their white collar counterparts, contrary to our 
expectation, but the effect is quite small after controlling for birth year effects.  The fraction of men self-
employed is associated with a higher LFPR, but virtually the entire effect is eliminated with controls for 
birth year effects. 
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while other variables take on their actual values.51  We picked the 1978 rules because 
these were among the most generous rules in the history of Social Security for men 
claiming benefits at the normal retirement age or earlier.  Benefit amounts were 
increasing prior to 1978, and subsequent reforms have reduced the generosity of Social 
Security benefits.  If changes to Social Security benefits are an important contributor to 
the downward LFP trend, then fixing benefits at their 1978 level should result in a much 
flatter LFP trajectory.  Figure 2.14 shows the results of simulations based on the first and 
fourth specifications in Table 2.1. The simulated counterfactual trajectory based on the 
no-birth-year-effects specification (Table 2.1, column 1) is in fact somewhat flatter than 
the baseline trajectory, but the trajectory based on the two-year-birth-cohort-effects 
specification is virtually identical to the baseline case using the observed changes in SS 
rules.  According to these results, the decline in LFP from the early 1960s through the 
end of the 1980s would have occurred even if there had been no changes in Social 
Security retirement rules.  This result is not an artifact of the specific choice of SS rules; 
using the rules for other years yields the same finding.   
The simulation results are quantified in Table 2.3, which shows that the mean 
LFPR at ages 55-69 declined by 18.4 percentage points between 1966-70 and 1988-92.  
The predicted decline in the LFPR generated by our model, given the observed changes 
in the explanatory variables during this period, is also 18.4 percentage points for all four 
specifications.  Table 2.3 shows that changes in Social Security retirement benefit rules 
can account for 19% of the observed decline in the LFPR using the no-birth-year-effects 
specification, but only 4% using the two-year-birth-cohort-effects specification.  Changes 
                                                 
51 Benefits are computed for each cohort as if they turn 62 in 1978 (birth year 1916), but using their actual 
earnings history.  This allows us to capture the effect of rule changes while holding earnings constant. 
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in the rules governing the SSDI benefit can explain 5-7% of the decline in older male 
LFP during this period.  Changes in average lifetime earnings since 1970 did not 
contribute at all to the downward trend in LFP: the simulations indicate that if average 
lifetime earnings had remained constant at the 1970 level, the downward trend would 
have been even stronger than the observed trend.  Finally, the table shows that the 
calendar year and birth year effects can “explain” virtually all the downward trend in the 
LFPR from 1966-70 to 1988-92.52   
Counterfactual simulation results for the other explanatory variables were very 
similar across all of the different specifications, so results are shown in Table 2.4 only for 
the specification with two-year birth year dummies.  None of these other variables can 
account for more than a tiny fraction of the decline in LFP.   
We now use our estimates to analyze the increase in the older male LFPR in 
recent years.  Table 2.5 shows that the LFPR increased by 4.7 percentage points between 
1988-92 and 2001-05, and our models predict exactly this increase given the observed 
changes in the explanatory variables.  We find that the observed increase in LFP can be 
entirely explained by changes in the education distribution, and this finding is robust 
across the alternative regression specifications.  More educated men participate in the 
labor force at higher rates (see Figure 2.5), and the proportion of older men with some 
college or a four year college degree has increased significantly since the mid 1980s (see 
Figure 2.4).  Figure 2.15 shows the implications of our estimates: if the education 
distribution of the older male labor force was fixed at its 1985 level, LFP would have 
continued to decline in the 1990s and 2000s rather than increase.  This finding is robust 
                                                 
52 Simulation results based on the assumption of myopic expectations concerning Social Security benefits 
have very similar implications: changes in Social Security benefits cannot explain the decline in male LFP. 
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to dropping the assumption of perfect foresight with respect to Social Security rules and 
replacing it with the assumption of myopic expectations (not shown).   
Another potential explanation for the rise in male LFP is the increase in the DRC.  
The first panel of Table 2.5 indicates that without controlling for birth cohort the rise in 
the DRC can explain 64% of the rise in the male LFPR. However, the magnitude of this 
effect is quite sensitive to the specification of birth cohort effects. The rise in the DRC 
can explain only 10% of the increase in LFP in the richest birth cohort specification. The 
other main change in Social Security policy during recent years, the rise in the NRA, can 
explain at most 12% of the increase in LFP.  Including any birth year effects in the model 
eliminates the NRA effect completely. 
Table 2.5 shows that changes in other explanatory variables either go in the wrong 
direction or account for only a modest proportion of the increase in LFP.  Changing 
patterns of pension coverage can account for 2-11% of the increase depending on the 
specification.  Calendar year and birth year effects appear to be moderately important in 
some specifications, but the results are not robust.  Changes in own wages cannot explain 
any of the increase in male LFP, and changes in the wife’s wage can explain 4-5% of the 
increase.53 
The specifications reported above restrict the effects of Social Security and other 
variables to be the same for different education groups, age groups, and time periods. 
                                                 
53 We estimated models with the same specification as in Table 1 but using the LFPR of the wives of the 
married men as the dependent variable.  These models show consistently positive and significant effects of 
wives’ wages on their own LFPR.  This suggests that factors that caused increased LFP of older married 
women in recent years may have contributed to the increase in older male LFP, but the simulation results in 
Table 5 suggest that the magnitude of such effects is very small.  In addition, we estimated a specification 
in which the LFP status of the wife is included as an explanatory variable, similar to the approach used in 
Schirle (2007).  The results show a strong positive association between the labor force participation of older 
men and their wives.  A counterfactual simulation based on the estimate indicated that growth in labor 
force participation of older married women could explain about one quarter of the recent increase in older 
male labor force participation.  This is virtually identical to Schirle’s result. 
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However, there is no particular reason to expect homogeneous effects across these 
groups. Therefore, we estimated additional models disaggregated by education, age, and 
calendar year, in order to determine whether there are any important differences in the 
effects of Social Security and other variables by education, age, and period.  The 
estimated Social Security effects were quite similar across the four education groups.  
Counterfactual simulations based on these disaggregated estimates revealed consistent 
patterns across education groups: as in the pooled estimates, changes in Social Security 
can account for at most one fifth of the decline in LFP, and adding richer controls for 
birth year effects reduced the estimated impact of Social Security substantially.  The 
effects were also similar across age groups (55-61, 62-64, 65-66, and 67-69) in the 
perfect foresight specification, but the myopic specification yielded substantially different 
effects of Social Security by age.  Specifically, the effects for ages 55-61 were similar to 
those reported in Table 2.2, while the effects for the three older age groups were more 
consistent with our prior expectations.  However, the magnitudes of these effects are 
highly sensitive to specification, and many are implausibly large.  Finally, estimates by 
period (1962-1988, 1989-2005) did not reveal any important differences in the effects of 
the key variables across periods.  
2.5.3 Reconciling results with the literature 
Our results imply that changes in Social Security benefits were not a major cause 
of the decline in LFP of older men up to the 1980s.  This finding is consistent with the 
results of Moffitt (1987), using time series data, and Krueger and Pischke (1992), who 
use synthetic panel data like ours.  Blau (1994) used longitudinal data on individuals and 
found that Social Security is important in accounting for variation across individuals in 
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the timing of labor force exit, but that trends over time in Social Security benefits could 
not explain much of the secular trend in the exit rate from the labor force over the period 
1961-1979.  Peracchi and Welch (1994) reached a similar conclusion, as did Burtless 
(1986), using longitudinal data.  However, Hurd and Boskin (1984) used longitudinal 
data on individuals for the period 1968-1973, and found that changes in Social Security 
benefits could explain the entire 8.2 percentage decrease in participation of men aged 59-
67 during this period.  Krueger and Pischke (1992) found different results for this period, 
using synthetic panel data: after accounting for calendar year fixed effects, Social 
Security benefits were found to have a small effect on LFP.  We attempted to replicate 
the Krueger-Pischke analysis, by aggregating our data over education groups and re-
estimating our model for the period 1967-1975 for ages 58-67.  Including age and 
calendar year fixed effects and excluding birth year controls, like Krueger and Pischke, 
we find that changes in Social Security benefits cannot explain any of the decrease in 
LFP during this period. Controlling for a quadratic birth year trend, Social Security can 
explain 6% of the decline; and controlling for five year birth cohort effects, Social 
Security can explain 33% of the decline.54  Thus the results are somewhat sensitive to 
specification, but they are closer to the findings of Krueger and Pischke than to the 
findings of Hurd and Boskin. 
Stewart (1995) used time series data through 1990 to update Moffitt’s (1987) 
analysis, and found that Social Security benefits could account for about 40% of the 
decline in LFP of men aged 62-64 and 65-69 from the early 1960s to 1990.  We re-
estimated our model using data through 1990, aggregated over education. Social Security 
                                                 
54 Estimates with two-year and one-year birth year effects yielded implausible results, indicating lack of 
identification.  Our specification is not the same as Krueger and Pischke, so we do not claim that this is a 
true replication effort, but the specifications are similar enough to make comparisons useful. 
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could explain as much as 19% of the decline in LFP for men aged 65-69 in the 
specification with a quadratic birth year trend, but the other specifications yielded much 
smaller effects.  At ages 62-64, Social Security could explain as much as 39% of the 
decline in the specification with two-year birth cohort effects, but again the effects were 
much smaller in the other specifications. 
Pingle (2006) uses micro data from the SIPP for 1983-2003 to estimate the effect 
on the employment of older men of the increase in the DRC mandated by the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments. His findings indicate that each one percentage point increase in 
the DRC raised the employment rate of men aged 65-70 by 1.5 percentage points and of 
men aged 60-70 by 1.8 percentage points.  He does not present counterfactual simulation 
results, but one can use the results in his paper to infer that the increase in the DRC from 
3% in 1983 to 6.5% in 2003 would be predicted by his model to have caused an increase 
in the employment rate of .0525 for men aged 65-69.  The observed increase was .0641, 
so his model can explain 82% of the observed increase as resulting from the increase in 
the DRC.  As noted above, with no control for birth year, our estimates indicate that the 
DRC could explain 64% of the observed increase in LFP, but the effect falls 
monotonically with richer birth year controls, and is only 10% with two-year birth year 
effects.  In order to provide a closer comparison to Pingle’s approach, we aggregated our 
data over education groups and re-estimated our model using the same years and ages as 
Pingle.  The results were again sensitive to birth year controls, but in this case the two-
year birth year effects specification (like the specification in Pingle’s Table 4, column 4)  
were closer to Pingle’s: the increase in the DRC can explain 139% of the observed 
increase in LFP of men aged 65-69 and 74% for men aged 62-64.   Our specification and 
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Pingle’s specifications are not nested, so the evidence is not definitive on the effects of 
the DRC. 
Mastrobuoni (2006) uses micro data from the CPS to estimate the impact on LFP 
of older men and women of the increase in the NRA mandated by the 1983 Social 
Security Amendments.55  He finds that for each two month increase in the NRA from 65 
to 66, the age of retirement (derived from a model of non-participation in the labor force) 
rose by one month.  Our results discussed above indicated that without any controls for 
birth year the increase in the NRA can explain only 10% of the observed increase in LFP 
at older ages; with birth year controls, the effect falls to zero.  Mastrobuoni’s 
specification includes age and birth cohort effects but not calendar year effects.  
Mastrobuoni’s model estimates the “treatment effect” of raising the NRA, while we force 
the effect of changes in the NRA to operate through benefits.  Mastrobuoni suggests that 
changes in the NRA may operate through non-economic channels, such as changing 
social norms or the “focal” retirement age.  His specification would pick up such effects 
while ours would not, thus potentially reconciling our estimate of a small effect of the 
NRA with Mastrobuoni’s large estimated effect.56 
2.5.4 Robustness 
We briefly summarize here the findings from a number of alternative 
specifications.  We repeated the analysis using an alternative measure of labor market 
                                                 
55 Duggan et al. (2005) investigate the effect of the increase in the NRA on SSDI enrollment, but they do 
not examine the effect on LFP.  Pingle (2006) finds a positive effect of the increase in the NRA on 
employment of men aged 60 to 70, but not for men aged 65 to 70.  However, his estimate is implausibly 
large: a one year increase in the NRA is estimated to increase employment by 6-13 percentage points (see 
his Table 6).  
56 Baker and Benjamin (1999) estimated the impact of a reduction in the age of eligibility for public 
pension benefits in Canada.  Their approach is similar to Mastrobuoni’s in the sense that they estimated the 
“treatment effect” of the change in age of eligibility.  Their estimates indicate that reducing the age of 
eligibility increased the rate of benefit receipt but did not reduce labor force participation.  They suggest 
that the marginal beneficiaries would have been out of the labor force anyway. 
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attachment: weeks worked in the previous calendar year.  The results were qualitatively 
very similar.  We replaced Social Security benefits with Social Security wealth, 
computed using a standard approach, described in the Appendix. The simulated effects of 
counterfactual Social Security scenarios were very similar using this approach.  We used 
alternative assumptions about year of birth in order to determine whether the results are 
sensitive to our assumption that all individuals have their birthdays after the March 
survey date.  The alternatives were to assume that everyone had their birthday before the 
survey date, and to randomly assign 80% of the observations to have their birthday after 
the survey date and 20% before the survey date.  The results were very similar using all 
three approaches.  We used an after-tax measure of the wage rate, described in the 
Appendix, and found virtually identical results.   
One potential problem with our education fixed effects specification is that the 
average skill of a given education group may decline as educational attainment increases.  
For example, the marginal college attendee today may have lower ability than in previous 
periods in which college attendance was less common.  This would imply that education 
effects on LFP should not be treated as fixed.57  To address this possibility, we included 
interactions between the education dummies and a linear time trend.  The implied effects 
of education were quite sensitive to birth year effects in this alternative specification, in 
contrast to the results reported in Table 2.5.  This suggests that our results attributing the 
recent increase in LFP to the changing education composition of the older male 
population may not be robust. 
Finally, our model omits wealth.  In order to determine whether the results are 
sensitive to this omission, we added two additional variables to the model.  One is the 
                                                 
57 We thank Mark Duggan for pointing this out to us. 
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capitalized value of income from interest, dividends, and rent (using a real return of 4%).  
The other is a binary indicator of home ownership.  These measures are available in the 
CPS on a consistent basis only from 1977 forward.  The estimates show a very small 
effect of capitalized asset income on LFP, and a rather large negative effect of home 
ownership.  Counterfactual simulation results indicate that changes in home ownership 
rates and in the capitalized value of asset income have had very little impact on the LFPR 
of older men. 
 
2.6  Conclusions 
Despite trends in benefit rules that suggest a potentially important role for Social 
Security, we find no evidence that changes in Social Security were a major cause of the 
decline in older male LFP from the 1960s through the 1980s.  Our estimates imply that 
changes in the rules that govern Social Security retirement benefits can explain at most 
19% of the observed decline in LFP from the late 1960s through the late 1980s.  Changes 
in rules governing SSDI benefits can explain another 7% of the decline. Our results imply 
that the long run trend has occurred mainly as a result of unobserved changes in 
preferences, constraints, or institutions over time and across birth cohorts.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the fact that LFP of older men was declining for several 
decades before implementation of Social Security in the U.S.  And it is consistent with 
the fact that LFP trends in many European countries have been similar to those in the 
U.S. despite differences in the timing of Social Security reforms. 
We find that the recent increase in the LFPR of older men can be accounted for by 
the changing educational composition of the older male labor force.  Low-participating 
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high school dropouts have been rapidly replaced in the older male population by higher-
participating college attendees and college graduates in recent years.  This result is robust 
across most but not all of the specifications we estimated.  Education is likely correlated 
with unobserved factors that influence preference for work, such as motivation.  Men 
with higher levels of education also enter the labor force at later ages, so it is possible that 
these men work longer to reach retirement incentive milestones (e.g. tenure rules 
associated with DB plans) or may simply prefer to exit the labor force at later ages.  We 
attribute a small role to the increases in the DRC, although in some specifications we find 
a larger effect. 
Our findings are consistent with those of several previous studies that suggest a 
small role for Social Security in explaining LFP trends.  Social Security incentives have 
been found to be powerful in explaining cross-country variation in retirement patterns 
(Gruber and Wise, 2004) and in explaining variation in labor force behavior within 
cohorts (e.g. Hurd and Boskin, 1984; Blau, 1994; Rust and Phelan, 1997).  In principle, 
these apparently contradictory results could be reconciled, depending on the relative 
magnitude of variation in Social Security benefits across countries, across individuals 
within a cohort, and across cohorts.  Alternatively, some sources of variation in Social 
Security benefits may be more plausibly exogenous than others.  Cross country 
differences in Social Security benefits and incentives may be confounded by unobserved 
differences across countries.  Cross-individual variation in Social Security benefits can 
identify behavioral responses only because of the non-linearity of the Social Security 
benefit rules.  Variation over cohorts in Social Security rules within a country may be the 
most plausibly exogenous source of variation available.  If this is the case, then our 
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estimates suggest that the true effect of Social Security on labor force participation at 
older ages is small.  Of course, our results cannot answer the obvious next question of 
interest: if it is not changes in Social Security (or pensions, EPRHI, or lifetime earnings) 
that have caused such striking trends in labor force behavior at older ages, then what is 
responsible?  
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Table 2.1   Labor Force Participation Model Estimates Assuming  
 Perfect Foresight 
 
None Quadratic 5 Year 2 Year 1 Year
SSBnra -0.206 *** -0.168 *** -0.090 *** -0.052 0.201 **
(0.024) (0.025) (0.033) (0.051) (0.099)
SSB62 - SSBnra -0.046 ** 0.015 -0.001 0.017 0.321 **
(0.023) (0.027) (0.032) (0.057) (0.159)
SSB70 - SSBnra 0.122 *** 0.082 *** 0.061 *** 0.027 -0.064
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.037) (0.067)
Disability Benefit -0.045 *** -0.065 *** -0.058 *** -0.065 *** -0.067 ***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
AME 0.037 *** 0.046 *** 0.022 ** 0.024 ** -0.020
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)
ln(own wage) 0.116 *** 0.116 *** 0.125 *** 0.120 *** 0.129 ***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
ln(spouse's wage) 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.018 0.020
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
DB Pension -0.035 0.005 -0.014 -0.017 -0.022
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
DC Pension 0.061 0.026 0.050 0.020 0.076
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.049)
EPRHI 0.015 0.004 0.009 0.002 -0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026)
Bad Health -0.294 *** -0.319 *** -0.299 *** -0.306 *** -0.294 ***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Married 0.183 *** 0.213 *** 0.195 *** 0.205 *** 0.218 ***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Previously Married 0.167 *** 0.175 *** 0.163 *** 0.169 *** 0.182 ***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
High School 0.026 *** 0.017 ** 0.016 ** 0.015 * 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Some College 0.041 *** 0.028 *** 0.028 ** 0.025 ** 0.018
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
College 0.053 *** 0.036 ** 0.040 ** 0.039 ** 0.038 *
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Black 0.003 0.013 -0.006 0.004 -0.013
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Constant 0.590 *** 357.137 *** 0.522 *** 0.506 *** 0.510 ***
(0.069) (67.175) (0.075) (0.079) (0.079)
Birth Year -0.366 ***
(0.070)
Birth Year Squared 0.009 ***
(0.002)
R Squared 0.962 0.963 0.963 0.964 0.964
P-Values
SS Benefits 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Specification - 0.0000 -    -    0.1752-    
Notes on Table 2.1:
"P-Value: Specification" is from F test against the specification in the previous column.
Birth Year Specification
OLS estimates with robust standard errors, 2453 observations.  All specifications include age and 
calendar year dummies.  * indicates significance at the 10% level  (** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% 
level).  Social Security retirement benefits are computed under the assumption of perfect foresight.  
"P-Value: SS Benefits" is from a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the four Social 
Security variables and AME are all equal to zero.
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Table 2.2  Labor Force Participation Model Estimates Assuming Myopia 
 
None Quadratic 5 Year 2 Year 1 Year
SSBnra 0.140 *** 0.131 *** 0.168 *** 0.246 *** 0.274 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
SSB62 - SSBnra 0.089 *** 0.101 *** 0.123 *** 0.268 *** 0.301 ***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032)
SSB70 - SSBnra -0.009 -0.018 -0.037 ** -0.085 *** -0.120 ***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.019) (0.022)
AME -0.037 *** -0.029 *** -0.026 *** -0.025 *** -0.034 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
R Squared 0.962 0.962 0.964 0.966 0.967
P-Values
SS Benefits 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Specification -    0.0125 -    -    0.0001
Notes on Table 2.1:  
"P-Value: Specification" is from F test against the specification in the previous column.
OLS estimates with robust standard errors, 2453 observations.  All specifications include age and 
calendar year dummies.  * indicates significance at the 10% level  (** at the 5% level; *** at the 
1% level).  Social Security retirement benefits are computed under the assumption of myopia.  
"P-Value: SS Benefits" is from a test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the four Social 
Birth Year Specification
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Table 2.3 Selected Counterfactual Simulations to Explain the Decline in 
Labor Force Participation, 1966-70 to 1988-92 
 
(a)  No Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual
LFPR
Predicted 
LFPR
Social 
Security 
Retirement
Social 
Security 
Disability
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year
1966 to 1970 73.0 72.9 70.6 71.9 72.9 72.8
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 55.7 54.4 49.8 70.9
Decrease 18.4 18.4 15.0 17.4 23.1 1.9
Difference 3.4 0.9 -4.7 16.5
% of Decrease 19% 5% -26% 90%  
 
(b)  Quadratic Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual
LFPR
Predicted 
LFPR
Social 
Security 
Retirement
Social 
Security 
Disability
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year
1966 to 1970 73.0 72.9 70.7 71.4 72.9 72.3
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.9 54.4 48.8 71.7
Decrease 18.4 18.4 15.8 17.0 24.2 0.6
Difference 2.6 1.4 -5.8 17.8
% of Decrease 14% 7% -31% 97%
 
 
(c)  Five-year Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual
LFPR
Predicted 
LFPR
Social 
Security 
Retirement
Social 
Security 
Disability
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year
1966 to 1970 73.0 73.0 72.1 71.6 73.0 71.5
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 55.0 54.4 51.7 70.6
Decrease 18.4 18.4 17.1 17.2 21.2 0.9
Difference 1.3 1.2 -2.8 17.5
% of Decrease 7% 7% -15% 95%
 
 
(d)  Two-year Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual
LFPR
Predicted 
LFPR
Social 
Security 
Retirement
Social 
Security 
Disability
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year
1966 to 1970 73.0 73.0 72.3 71.4 73.0 72.0
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.4 51.6 72.0
Decrease 18.4 18.4 17.7 17.0 21.4 0.0
Difference 0.7 1.4 -3.0 18.4
% of Decrease 4% 7% -16% 100%
 
 
Notes on Table 2.3: 
 Counterfactual values for SSBNRA, SSB62, and SSB70 are computed for each cohort using their actual earnings 
history and the Social Security rules in effect as if they turn 62 in 1978 (birth year 1916).  Counterfactual Social 
Security Disability Insurance benefits are generated by computing SSDI for each cohort and age under the rules in 
effect in 1970.  Counterfactual Average Lifetime Earnings are generated by assigning the average of AME between 
1966 and 1970 to every cohort.  The calendar year counterfactual value is 1968; the birth year counterfactual value 
is 1906. 
 The “Social Security Retirement” counterfactual is the predicted LFPR where actual values for SSBNRA, SSB62, and 
SSB70 are replaced by their counterfactual values, and all other variables take on their actual values.  Similarly, the 
“Social Security Disability”, “Average Lifetime Earnings”, “Calendar Year”, and “Birth Year” counterfactual is the 
predicted LFPR where the variable of interest is replaced by its counterfactual value, and all other variables take on 
their actual values.  
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Table 2.4:  Additional Counterfactual Simulations to Explain the Decline  
 in Labor Force Participation, 1966-70 to 1988-92 
 
Actual
LFPR
Predicted
LFPR Black
Marital
Status Health Pensions EPRHI
Own
Wage
Spouse's
Wage Education
1966 to 1970 73.0 73.0 73.0 73.0 72.9 73.0 73.0 73.0 73.0 69.3
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.5 54.6 54.3 54.6 54.6 55.5 54.7 49.2
Decrease 18.4 18.4 18.4 18.3 18.6 18.4 18.4 17.4 18.3 20.2
Difference 0.0 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.1 -1.8
% of Decrease 0% 0% -1% 0% 0% 5% 1% -10%
 
 
Notes on Table 2.4: 
 The counterfactual value for each variable of interest is its average value between 1966 and 1970.  Counterfactual 
LFPR is the predicted value (based on coefficient estimates from the specification with two-year birth cohort effects) 
where the variable of interest is replaced by its counterfactual value, and all other values take on their actual 
values.   
 
 
 
 Table 2.5  Selected Counterfactual Simulations to Explain the Increase in Labor Force Participation,  
 1988-92 to 2001-05 
 
(a)  No Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual 
LFP
Predicted 
LFP Black
Marital 
Status Health Pensions EPRHI
Own 
Wage
Spouse's 
Wage
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
SS Rules:  
DRC
SS Rules: 
NRA
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year Education
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 53.9 54.8 54.6 53.4
2001 to 2005 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.5 59.7 58.7 59.3 59.2 59.0 58.5 55.6 58.9 59.5 52.4
Increase 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.1 4.1 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.0 1.7 4.1 4.8 -0.9
Difference 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 3.0 0.6 -0.2 5.6
% of Increase 0% -5% -10% 13% -1% 0% 4% 15% 64% 12% -3% 120%
 
 
(b)  Quadratic Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual 
LFP
Predicted 
LFP Black
Marital 
Status Health Pensions EPRHI
Own 
Wage
Spouse's 
Wage
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
SS Rules:  
DRC
SS Rules: 
NRA
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year Education
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.2 54.7 54.2 53.4
2001 to 2005 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.6 59.7 59.1 59.2 59.2 59.0 58.4 57.2 59.5 57.5 52.3
Increase 4.7 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.2 4.6 4.7 4.7 4.5 3.8 3.1 4.7 3.3 -1.1
Difference 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 1.6 -0.1 1.4 5.7
% of Increase 0% -7% -11% 2% 0% 0% 4% 18% 34% -2% 29% 123%
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 (c)  Five-year Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual 
LFP
Predicted 
LFP Black
Marital 
Status Health Pensions EPRHI
Own 
Wage
Spouse's 
Wage
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
SS Rules:  
DRC
SS Rules: 
NRA
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year Education
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.2 54.7 55.0 53.3
2001 to 2005 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.5 59.7 58.9 59.2 59.2 59.1 58.8 57.5 59.2 59.5 52.3
Increase 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.1 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.3 3.2 4.5 4.5 -1.0
Difference 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.4 0.2 0.2 5.7
% of Increase 0% -7% -10% 8% 0% 0% 4% 9% 31% 3% 4% 122%
 
 
(d)  Two-year Birth Cohort Effects 
Actual 
LFP
Predicted 
LFP Black
Marital 
Status Health Pensions EPRHI
Own 
Wage
Spouse's 
Wage
Average 
Lifetime 
Earnings
SS Rules:  
DRC
SS Rules: 
NRA
Calendar 
and Birth 
Year Education
1988 to 1992 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.6 54.4 54.6 55.6 53.3
2001 to 2005 59.2 59.2 59.2 59.6 59.7 59.0 59.2 59.2 59.0 58.8 58.6 59.4 59.3 52.3
Increase 4.7 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.2 4.4 4.7 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.8 3.8 -1.0
Difference 0.0 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 -0.1 0.9 5.7
% of Increase 0% -7% -10% 5% 0% 0% 5% 9% 10% -2% 19% 122%
 
 
Notes on Table 2.5: 
 For the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) counterfactual, SSBNRA and SSB62  are computed for each cohort using their actual earnings history and actual Social Security rules.  
SSB70 is computed using SSBnra and the DRC rules in place prior to the 1983 amendments.  For the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) counterfactual, SSBnra, SSB62, and SSB70 are 
computed using actual earnings histories and counterfactual Social Security rules where the NRA is equal to 65 for all birth cohorts.  The calendar year counterfactual value is 
1990; the birth year counterfactual value is 1928.  For each other variable the counterfactual value is its average between 1988 and 1992.  The counterfactual LFPR is the 
predicted value (based on relevant coefficient estimates) where the variable of interest is replaced by its counterfactual value, and all other values take on their actual values. 
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Figure 2.1  LFPR Trends by Age Group58 
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Figure 2.2  LFPR of Men Aged 55 to 69 
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58 Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Figure 2.3  LFPR by Age Group  
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Figure 2.4  Educational Distribution 
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Figure 2.5  LFPR by Education  
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Figure 2.6  Incidence of Bad Health (by Data Source) 
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Figure 2.7  Monthly Social Security Benefit by Claim Age (2005 $)  
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Figure 2.8  Monthly Social Security Disability Insurance Benefit (2005 $) 
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Figure 2.9  Average Monthly Earnings by Education (2005 $) 
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Figure 2.10  Male Wage by Education  (in logs, 2005 $) 
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Figure 2.11  Spouse's Wage by Education of Husband (in logs, 2005 $) 
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Figure 2.12  Pension and Retiree Health Insurance Coverage 
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Figure 2.13  Actual vs Predicted LFPR by Age Group 
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Figure 2.14  Downtrend Counterfactual:  Social Security 
 
 
(a)  No Birth Cohort Effects 
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(b)  Two-year Birth Cohort Effects 
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Figure 2.15  Uptrend Counterfactual:  Educational Distribution 
 
 
(a)  No Birth Cohort Effects 
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(b)  Two-year Birth Cohort Effects 
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Figure 2.16  Uptrend Counterfactual:  Social Security 
 
 
(a)  No Birth Cohort Effects 
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(b)  Two-year Birth Cohort Effects 
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 Appendix A    
 
Table A.1:  OLS Estimates, Dependent Variable is LFP 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error
Total Wealth -0.0153 (0.0027) ***
Year Dummies
Year = 1998 -0.0041 (0.0117)
Year = 2000 -0.0185 (0.0173)
Year = 2002 0.0073 (0.0212)
Year = 2004 0.0291 (0.0253)
Age Dummies
Age = 55 -0.1401 (0.0387) ***
Age = 56 -0.1046 (0.0332) ***
Age = 57 -0.1288 (0.0346) ***
Age = 58 -0.1651 (0.0337) ***
Age = 59 -0.1770 (0.0354) ***
Age = 60 -0.2077 (0.0348) ***
Age = 61 -0.2734 (0.0361) ***
Age = 62 -0.3621 (0.0365) ***
Age = 63 -0.4302 (0.0371) ***
Age = 64 -0.4695 (0.0379) ***
Age = 65 -0.5440 (0.0393) ***
Age = 66 -0.5667 (0.0411) ***
Age = 67 -0.6073 (0.0428) ***
Age = 68 -0.6123 (0.0449) ***
Age = 69 -0.6310 (0.0466) ***
Age = 70 -0.6833 (0.0482) ***
Age = 71 -0.6469 (0.0544) ***
Age = 72 -0.6902 (0.0562) ***
Age = 73 -0.6672 (0.0713) ***
Dependent Variable:  Labor Force Participation
 
 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error
Personal Characteristics
HS Degree 0.0015 (0.0223)
Some College 0.0416 (0.0258)
College Degree 0.0913 (0.0288) ***
Black -0.0158 (0.0232)
Hispanic 0.1029 (0.0281) ***
Married 0.0703 (0.0239) ***
Bad Health -0.2168 (0.0157) ***
Local Economic Conditions
Unemployment % -0.0048 (0.0034)
Per Capita Income 0.5160 (0.1825) ***
Share Manual Labor -0.0031 (0.0932)
Inheritance Expectations
Missing Inheritance Expectations -0.0327 (0.0196) *
Inheritance Probability -0.0514 (0.0328)
Expect Inheritance 0.0316 (0.0215)
Expected Inh. Amt -0.0001 (0.0061)
Expected Inh. Amt Missing -0.0104 (0.0398)
Mother has No HS Degree -0.0139 (0.0177)
Nbr Living Parents 0.0188 (0.0148)
Married 0.0402 (0.0246)
Spouse's Mother has no HS Degree -0.0361 (0.0199) *
Spouse's Nbr Living Parents 0.0342 (0.0130) ***
Constant 0.7555 (0.0837) ***
Notes on Appendix Table 1:
Dependent Variable:  Labor Force Participation
OLS estimates with standard errors clustered by individual, 8021 Observations.  Wealth 
is measured in units of 100,000 of 1992 dollars. * indicates significance at the 10% level  
(** at the 5% level; *** at the 1% level).  
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Appendix B 
B1.  Social Security Benefits 
Our analysis requires measures of mean Social Security benefits by cohort.  
Cohorts are defined by birth year (1892 to 1949) and education group (less than high 
school; high school graduate; some college; college graduate).  Cohort Social Security 
benefits are a function of Social Security regulations (which vary by birth year) and mean 
earnings history of each cohort (which varies by birth year and education group).  Section 
B.1.1 details the methods used to construct earnings histories; Section B.1.2 describes 
how these earnings histories are used to compute cohort specific measures of monthly 
Social Security benefits; and section B.1.3 describes how monthly benefits are converted 
to measures of Social Security Wealth.   
B1.1 Cohort Specific Earnings Histories 
We construct mean earnings at ages 27 through 70 for each cohort using data 
from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1962 and 2005 and from 
editions of the Annual Statistical Supplement published by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) between 1973 and 2005.   
The SSA data contain median earnings of male workers by age group (25-29, 30-
34, etc.) and calendar year (1937, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1955, and 1960 through 2005).  We 
first convert median earnings to mean earnings for each age group and calendar year cell 
using the CPS.  In each year of the CPS, respondents report their earnings from the 
previous year.  We use these data to calculate mean earnings, median earnings, and their 
ratio by age group for years 1961 through 2004.59  We then estimate the model 
                                                 
59 We capped reported earnings in the CPS at the maximum taxable earnings for that year before computing 
means and medians by cell.   
92 
ayaaay yMM εαα ++= 10  separately by age group, where ayMM is the mean-median ratio 
for age group a in calendar year y.  The estimates are used to generate a predicted value 
of ayMM  for each age group-calendar year cell.  Each value for median earnings reported 
in the SSA is then multiplied by the predicted value of the mean-median ratio for the 
corresponding age cell to create measures of mean earnings by calendar year and age 
group.   
Next, we assign our measure of mean earnings by calendar year and age group to 
the midpoint age of that cell.  The midpoint age and calendar year is then used to 
compute birth year.  For example, mean earnings of men ages 25-29 in 1972 was $6,870 
(based on median earnings of $7,405 published by SSA and the ratio of mean to median 
earnings for this cell in the CPS); this value is assigned to age 27 for birth cohort 1945.  
To limit selection bias due to non-participation, we ignore SSA earnings data for age 
groups below 25 and above 59.  This process results in values for mean earnings at ages 
27, 32, 37, 42, 47, 52, and 57 for each age and birth cohort covered by the SSA data. 60   
Because the Annual Statistical Supplement does not include earnings data in years 
prior to 1937 (and only in select years between 1937 and 1960), we are unable to assign a 
value for mean earnings to some age and birth cohort cells.  For example, earnings at age 
27 (based on age group 25 to 29) are unavailable for birth cohorts prior to 1910; earnings 
at age 32 are unavailable for birth cohorts prior to 1905; and so on. We impute the 
missing values for each age by interpolating and extrapolating earnings from observed 
birth years.  We regress log mean earnings on a sixth order polynomial in birth year b 
                                                 
60 Assigning earnings by age group to the midpoint age of each cell is arbitrary, but is preferable to the 
alternative of assigning the earnings value to every age in the cell.  The latter approach would impose the 
restriction that earnings are equal across some successive birth cohorts and ages.  For instance, from the 
example described above, mean earnings of $6,870 would be assigned to age 25 for birth year 1947; age 26 
for birth year 1946; age 27 for birth year 1945; age 28 for birth year 1944; and age 29 for birth year 1943.   
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separately for each age a using the model ab
j
j
ajab bE εβ +=∑
=
6
0
)ln( .  Estimates of this 
model allow us to generate predicted values of earnings at ages 27, 32, 37, 42, 47, 52, and 
57 for all birth years in our sample.  The predicted values from our estimates closely 
match the actual values, and the models generate reasonable predicted values for the age 
groups and birth years not included in the SSA tables.   
Our next step is to “fill in” earnings data at ages 28 to 31, 33 to 36, 38 to 41, 42 to 
46, 48 to 51, and 53 to 56 for each birth cohort by linearly interpolating from observed 
earnings at ages 27, 32, 37, 42, 47, 52, and 57.  We regress predicted mean earnings 
(from the previous step) on a fourth order polynomial in age separately for each birth 
year using the model ∑
=
+=
4
0
ˆ
j
ba
j
bjba aE τγ .  Estimates of this model are used to generate 
predicted values of mean earnings at ages 27 through 57 for each birth year cell in our 
sample.  We then compute earnings at ages 58 through 70 by assuming that nominal 
earnings at ages 57 and later grow at the rate of the average annual wage as published in 
the SSA.61 
Finally, we use CPS data to disaggregate earnings histories by education group.  
We compute the ratio of mean earnings for each education group to mean population 
earnings in the CPS separately by birth year.62  We denote this measure the “earnings-
                                                 
61 For cohorts who reach ages 58 to 70 in future years we assume that nominal earnings grow at 3% 
annually.     
62 Ideally we could compute earnings-ratios separately for each education group by birth-year and age.  
However, because the CPS only goes back to 1962 we lack data on earnings at younger ages for earlier 
birth years.  Thus our measure of the earnings ratio “averages out” life-cycle earnings patterns for each 
birth year.  This creates biases for at least two reasons.  First, the returns to schooling are higher at older 
ages, so for higher levels of education we overstate mean earnings at younger ages and understate mean 
earnings at older ages.  The opposite is true for lower levels of education.  Second, because we do not 
observe younger ages for earlier birth years in the CPS, and earnings for better educated men are relatively 
94 
ratio” beER , where b is birth year and e is education group.  Because we don’t observe 
earnings prior to age 57 for birth years before 1906 in the CPS, we assign the 1906 
earnings-ratio to these birth years.  We then compute predicted values of the earnings-
ratio from estimates of a third order polynomial regression of beER  on birth year using 
the model be
j
j
ejbe bER µλ +=∑
=
3
0
.63  These predicted earnings ratios are used to construct 
education group-specific measures of mean earnings (E) by age and birth cohort 
according to the formula ebbaeba EREE
∧
= *ˆˆ .  For example, for the 1945 birth cohort, 
predicted mean earnings at age 27 are $7,136 (“actual” mean earnings for this cell are 
$6,870 as noted above).  The predicted ratio of mean earnings of college educated men to 
all men born in 1945 is 1.30.  Thus, mean earnings of the college educated 1945 birth 
cohort at age 27 are $9,277.  This computation is done for each birth year, age, and 
education group cell; these are the final measures of mean earnings used to compute 
Social Security Benefits.     
    There are some limitations of using CPS data to calculate Social Security 
earnings histories.  The CPS includes some workers who may not have been covered by 
Social Security, particularly in earlier years.  In addition, the CPS data (generated from 
surveys) is likely subject to a higher degree of measurement error then the SSA data 
(generated from administrative records).  To address this, we removed observations with 
suspect earnings data from our sample.  We dropped all records where the real weekly 
wage (total earnings in the previous calendar year / number of weeks worked last year) 
                                                                                                                                                 
higher at later ages, we are overstating (understating) the ratio of mean earnings to population earnings for 
higher (lower) levels of education at earlier birth years. 
63 We omit cells with sample size less than 30 from this regression. 
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was below $50 and above $40,000.    This reduced the number of observations with 
positive earnings in our CPS sample by 2.8% (18,881 records).   
B1.2 Computing Cohort Specific Social Security Benefits 
We use the earnings history generated for each birth year and education group cell 
to compute the monthly Social Security Benefit (SSB) conditional on claiming at age t, 
using cohort mean earnings at each age between 27 and age t-1, where t is 62, the NRA, 
or 70.  Although our data are annualized, we compute the SSB conditional on claiming 
benefits precisely at the age (in months) of the cohort-specific NRA.  For cohorts born in 
1942 and earlier, we include earnings from ages 27 through 64, and for cohorts born in 
1943 and later we include earnings between ages 27 and 65 (because the NRA for the 
latter cohorts is 66)64.   
We construct benefits under two alternative assumptions about future rule 
changes:  perfect foresight and myopia.  In both cases we assume that future earnings, 
future average annual wages used to index wages, and future inflation rates are known 
with perfect foresight.  Computing benefits under the assumption of perfect foresight is 
equivalent to using the benefit rules in place at the assumed claim age.  We use the 
ANYPIA benefit calculator provided by the Social Security Administration to compute 
SSB in this case.65  Based on birth year and retirement age, the ANYPIA program 
computes the appropriate Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) and monthly benefit for a 
given earnings history.  Under the assumption of perfect foresight there is no variation in 
the SSB for a given claim age within birth cohort.   
                                                 
64 Per Social Security rules, earnings in the year that Social Security benefits are claimed are ignored in the 
computation of PIA.   
65 The ANYPIA program is available on the Social Security Website at  
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ANYPIA/anypia.html 
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Alternatively, under myopia we compute the SSB for a given claim age in year t 
using the rules that, as of year t, are scheduled to be in place at the assumed claiming age.    
This assumption results in variation in the SSB by age for a given birth-year-education 
group cell if there were rule changes between year t and the year in which the individual 
reaches the assumed claiming age.  This variation is most significant in years up to and 
including the 1977 amendments when substantial rule changes were implemented with 
relatively little lead time.  However, legislation passed in 1983 announced changes in the 
normal retirement age and the delayed retirement credit many years in advance.  As a 
result these changes were known at earlier ages even under the assumption of myopia, 
resulting in very little variation in SSB by age in the later years of our sample.  The 
ANYPIA program is unable to calculate expected SSB under myopia, so we wrote our 
own SAS code to do this. 
B1.3 Computing Social Security Wealth 
 In an alternative empirical specification we replace monthly Social Security 
Benefits with Social Security Wealth, the expected present discounted value of lifetime 
Social Security retirement benefits.  Social Security Wealth is defined as 
∑
=
−+=
T
aj
ja
iaia rSSBSSW )1( , where iaSSB  is the monthly Social Security benefit awarded 
to cohort i conditional on claim age a (a = 62, NRA, 70); T is life expectancy (in months) 
from age a, based on life tables published by the Social Security Administration; and r is 
the monthly interest rate, here set at .167, or roughly 2% annually.  We assume the 
individual survives with certainty to his expected age at death, T, in order to simplify the 
calculations. 
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B1.4 Computing Cohort Specific Social Security Disability Insurance  
 Benefits 
We use the ANYPIA program and the earnings history generated for each birth 
year and education group cell to compute the monthly Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) benefit.  For each potential claim age t we assume full time work 
through period t-2 and no work in period t-1 and t.  Because SSDI benefits are converted 
to retirement benefits after reaching the NRA, we set SSDI to 0 at ages greater than or 
equal to the NRA.   The Social Security rules used to compute SSDI depends only on the 
year in which disability benefits are claimed, and not on the birth year.   
 
B2.  Pensions and Employer-Provided Retiree health Insurance (EPRHI) 
Pension measures were derived from SIPP topical modules in the 1984 panel 
(wave 4), 1986 panel (wave 4), 1990 panel (wave 4), 1991 panel (wave 7), 1992 panel 
(wave 4), 1996 panel (wave 7), and 2001 panel (wave 7). Other panels were excluded due 
to incompleteness of data or changes in questionnaire design. These data have small 
sample sizes for earlier birth years: those who were born in 1900 are 84 at the time of the 
first survey so there is likely to be significant mortality bias. 
Different questions on pensions are asked depending on whether the respondent is 
currently working, has had a job in the past, has received a lump sum payment from a 
retirement plan, or is currently receiving retirement benefits (other than Social Security).  
We compute binary pension coverage indicators as follows:  
-- Defined Benefit (DB): DB coverage is assumed if (a) the pension from the current 
job is a DB plan, or (b) the respondent expects to receive pension benefits from a 
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past job, or (c) the retirement benefits he is currently receiving are from a DB 
plan.  Otherwise the respondent does not have a DB plan. 
-- Defined Contribution (DC):  DC coverage is assumed if (a) the pension from his 
current job is a DC plan, or (b) he owns a business that has a pension plan he 
participates in, or (c) he is receiving retirement benefits from a DC plan, or (d) he 
received a lump sum payment from a pension plan in the past.  Otherwise the 
respondent does not have a DC plan.   
A SIPP respondent is asked about EPHRI coverage only if he is currently 
receiving retirement benefits.  The binary EPRHI coverage indicator is set to 1 if the 
SIPP respondent affirms that he has health coverage provided by a former employer, and 
0 otherwise.  
 
B3.  Wages 
Wage rates are constructed from CPS data for the men in our sample and their 
spouses.  The wage rate is defined as total earnings from wages and salary in the previous 
year divided by annual hours worked in the previous year.  Annual hours is the product of 
weeks worked in the previous year and “hours usually worked per week in the previous 
year” for survey years 1976 and later.  In years prior to 1976 annual hours is defined as 
the product of weeks worked in the previous year and hours worked in the week prior to 
the survey.  We follow Blau and Kahn (2007) in the handling of top-coded values for 
earnings.  Generally top-coded values are multiplied by a factor of 1.45 and included in 
the sample used to estimate the regression equation.  Again following Blau and Kahn 
(2007), we convert all wages to real 2005 dollars and drop observations with hourly 
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wages below $2 and above $200.     
We only observe wages for those in our sample who choose to work.  Therefore 
we replace observed wages with predicted log wages from regression equations estimated 
separately by birth year, sex, and education group.  The wage equations include as 
regressors a quadratic in age and indicators for race (white, black, or other), marital status 
(married, once-married, never-married), geographic region (Northeast, Midwest, South, 
West), and metropolitan status. 
The marginal tax rate is calculated for each individual in the CPS sample using 
the TAXSIM program provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research.66  The 
marginal federal tax rate (MFTR) is computed based on labor earnings assuming full-
time work (2000 hours annually) at the predicted wage rate, observed earnings of the 
wife (if married), and income from interest, dividends, and net rentals.  Payroll taxes for 
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) and Hospital Insurance (HI) are 
applied to labor earnings (assuming full time work at the predicted wage rate) up to the 
maximum taxable earnings amount.  The after-tax wage rate is the product of the 
predicted wage rate and (1 – MFTR – (OASDI+HI) ).   
 
                                                 
66 See http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/taxsim-calc7/index.html 
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